Iran’s Attacks on Bahrain May Open the Door to Increased Cooperation with Israel
- Yossi Mann & Oded Raanan
- Mar 16
- 7 min read
Updated: Mar 30
Tehran's missiles and drone strikes on Gulf countries have made their need for increased defense procurement clear. As a result, the UAE-Israel defense cooperation framework may now also become more attractive for neighbouring Bahrain. Israel must now begin to silently lay the foundations for deepening defense ties with Manama, which can then be expanded once the war ends
Iran’s continuous ballistic missile and drone attacks against its neighbors since the beginning of the US-led “Operation Epic Fury” have forced Gulf states to urgently rethink their regional grand strategy. By deliberately targeting airports, energy infrastructure, residential areas, and more, Tehran has dragged the Gulf Cooperation Council’s members into a war that they have worked hard to avoid.[1]
This unexpected development has made two facts clear: first, years-long attempts to contain or appease Tehran have failed;[2] second, most Gulf states arrived largely unprepared for this type of warfare and risk losing economic and energy security.
As the region’s countries now scramble to acquire additional means to defend themselves against their aggressive neighbor, Iran’s surprising escalation may also present Israel with an opportunity to deepen security ties with Gulf states. Among these countries, Bahrain can, and should, be its primary focus. But success will take time and require proactive diplomacy, a careful analysis of the new security situation in the Gulf and the region’s needs, and nuanced public messaging. Even then, quiet cooperation, rather than public embrace, will remain the more realistic path forward.
A Rationale for Cooperation
Jerusalem maintains both formal and discreet relations with most Gulf capitals. Its closest partners are the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain, two of the four signatories to the 2020 Abraham Accords. The 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel and subsequent “Swords of Iron” war which ended in October 2025 had varying effects on Israel’s standing in the Gulf, some of which also shape the current situation in the region. In general, while normalization has proven more resilient than some may have expected, deepening or expanding it remains constrained by the events of the Gaza war and Arab public opinion.
Israel-UAE ties remained steadfast during “Swords of Iron.” Both countries have significantly deepened their partnership through bilateral collaboration in cutting-edge fields such as security, artificial intelligence, financial technology (fintech) and cybersecurity. Trade and bilateral cooperation have also expanded to many other areas, including agriculture, education, energy, health and water security.[3]
In contrast, the two-year war led to a distancing between Bahrain and Israel. While diplomatic channels remain open, ambassadors have been exchanged, and there has been a stream of economic engagements, relations remain underdeveloped even after the ceasefire was reached between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.
The end of the war allowed cautious attempts by Jerusalem and Manama to rebuild ties. Now, the threat from Iran has strengthened the rationale for tightening security and defense cooperation, while the circumstances in which the war broke out simultaneously make it more difficult.
From Opportunity to Urgent Need
From a security standpoint, the importance of reinvigorated Israel-Bahrain cooperation cannot be overstated. Both nations share a strategic imperative to counter Iranian destabilization efforts across the Middle East, as evidenced in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between them in 2022.[4] Home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, Bahrain and its armed forces have been hit by Iran regional proxies in recent years,[5] and have been directly targeted in the recent conflict.[6]
Bahrain is also an important regional security actor and, inter alia, party to the trilateral Comprehensive Security and Integrated Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA), alongside the United States and Britain, marking its significance to these powers.[7] In early March 2026, senior defense representatives from the three countries held a virtual meeting during the Iran war to discuss “the Iranian aggression against innocent civilians all across the Middle East” and working together “to ensure peace and stability in the region.”[8]
The defense partnership model established between Israel and UAE since 2020 may now become more appealing to Bahrain. In recent years, Abu-Dhabi acquired numerous air defense systems from Israeli arms industries and participated in multinational air exercises in which the Israeli air force also took part. The two also hold joint intelligence-sharing protocols and cybersecurity cooperation.[9] In late 2025, a French website reported that the UAE signed a $2.3bn contract with Elbit Systems for an advanced air defense system.[10]
During the recent war, Israeli-made BARAK and SPYDER systems have been defending Abu-Dhabi from Iran’s ballistic and cruise missiles and one-way suicide drones, alongside American-made systems.[11] The UAE’s Ministry of Defence publishes daily numbers of attacks detected and intercepted.[12]
Thus, a reinvigorated security partnership between Jerusalem and Bahrain, rooted in intelligence sharing, joint planning, and technological collaboration can enhance Bahrain’s physical and energy security. It may also strengthen regional security architectures with like-minded actors, which may develop as a result of the current war. Even if tangible progress is difficult to achieve during active fighting, Israel should begin quietly laying the foundations for deeper security cooperation now.
Caveats
While the war with Iran has arguably strengthened Bahrain’s rationale for deepening ties with Israel, several significant obstacles remain. First, even before the current war, Bahraini public opinion largely opposed normalization with Israel.[13] Bahrainis’ reluctance, and even hostility, towards relations with Israel became front and center during the “Swords of Iron” war and especially its campaign in Gaza.[14]
Like other Gulf countries, Bahrain has grown to see Israeli success in dismantling Iran’s “axis of resistance” during the “Swords of Iron” war as a sign of Israeli “expansionism” in Syria, Lebanon, and the West Bank. Similarly, Israel’s missile strike in Qatar in September 2025 was a turning point, heightening Gulf states' wariness of Israel’s growing regional power and willingness to use force across the region.[15]
On the domestic front, Iran is likely targeting Bahrain in an effort to foment internal strife and deepen sectarian tensions between the Sunni ruling elite and the Shi’ite majority. During the war, opposition forces – mainly from parts of the Shi’ite society – have openly blamed Israel, alongside the United States, for instigating the war and for the damage caused to their country, and there have been reports of public protests.[16] Some factions have also pledged their support for Iran’s new supreme leader, Mujtaba Khamenei.[17]
Iran arguably hopes public unrest, similar to that the Kingdom experienced during the 2011 Arab Spring, may threated the ruling Sunni elite. However, as of the time of writing, the country’s authorities reportedly have a firm grasp on power.[18]
Transforming Goodwill Into Tangible Results
The end of the “Swords of Iron” war and the current war with Iran offer a chance to ask not just what has happened but what should happen next. Israel and Bahrain have a rare opportunity to turn urgent security needs into tangible diplomatic results: first and foremost – enhanced security cooperation, which may drive deeper diplomatic and economic ties in the future. Both sides stand to gain from upgrading their relationship, both bilaterally and as part of a wider regional architecture.
In order to reinvigorate ties at this extremely tense moment, Israel must first and foremost keep all initiatives and collaboration discreet. It must respect the Bahraini ruling class’s political situation and ensure that any joint activities remain discreet.
Israel can also work with Western and regional partners to support Bahrain diplomatically and reinforce the stability of the current normalization framework. Such a step will signal Manama that Israel is actively helping the current monarchy and lay a foundation of goodwill for future engagements. Once the war ends, it must strive to tailor a defense suite for Bahrain – mainly air defense and cybersecurity – similar to that which it employs as part of its partnership with the UAE.
If done correctly and discreetly, Bahrain, with its strategic positioning, financial prowess, and multicultural society, can help Israel ensure that the current regional instability strengthens cooperation among the moderate states that share an interest in regional stability. Working carefully and deliberately to deepen ties with Manama can help make the region, and Israel in it, more secure and prosperous after the war.
Dr. Yossi Mann is a senior research fellow at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations, where he leads the Israel-Arab Gulf Program. He is a researcher at Bar-Ilan University and a lecturer at the School of Government at Reichman University.
Oded Raanan is the Editor-in-Chief of "The Arena" magazine.
Notes
* The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoW endorsement.
[1] Barbara Plett-Usher, “All red lines have been crossed': Gulf states weigh response to Iranian strikes,” BBC, 3 March 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjrqqd8lw2wo
[2] David Luhnow and Stephen Kalin, “Gulf States Had a Strategy of Playing Nice With Iran. It Failed.” The Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2026. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/gulf-states-had-a-strategy-of-playing-nice-with-iran-it-failed-8859f84e
[3] Giorgio Cafiero, “Five Years On, UAE-Israel Normalization Weathers the Gaza Storm,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, Doha, 1 September 2025. https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/five-years-on-uae-israel-normalization-weathers-the-gaza-storm/
[4] “Israel defence minister signs security agreement with Bahrain,” Reuters, 3 February 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-defence-minister-visits-us-navy-base-bahrain-2022-02-03/; See also: Dan Kenner, “Arab states expanded cooperation with Israeli military during Gaza war, files show,” The Washington Post, 11 October 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/10/11/us-israel-arab-military-leaked-documents/
[5] “Scores of Gulf troops killed in Yemen conflict,” Al-Jazeera, 5 September 2015. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/9/5/scores-of-gulf-troops-killed-in-yemen-conflict
[6] “Bahrain says US Navy's 5th Fleet headquarters hit in 'missile attack'”, Economic Times, 28 February 2026. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/iran-israel-war-bahrain-says-us-navys-5th-fleet-headquarters-hit-in-missile-attack/articleshow/128880732.cms
[7] “UK signs to join C-SIPA at the invitation of Kingdom of Bahrain and United States,” News, Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2025. https://www.mofa.gov.bh/en/uk-signs-to-join-c-sipa-at-the-invitation-of-kingdom-of-bahrain-and-united-states
[8] "בחריין, בריטניה וארצות הברית קיימו פגישה וירטואלית לקבוצת העבודה להגנה של ה־C-SIPA", Press Release Hebrew , פיקוד המרכז של ארה"ב, 7 במארס 2026. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/HEBREW-PRESS-RELEASES/Hebrew-Press-Release-View/Article/4428057/c-sipa/
[9] Elizabeth Dent, “Israel-UAE Defense Cooperation Grows Under the Abraham Accords,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 8 August 2025. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-uae-defense-cooperation-grows-under-abraham-accords; Yuval Azulay, “The Attack on Gulf States Can Become a Bonanza for Israeli Security Firms,” Calcalist, 5 March 2026 (in Hebrew). https://www.calcalist.co.il/magazine/article/g92aareiy
[10] Dean Shmuel Elmas, “Elbit’s mystery $2.3b customer named as UAE – report,” Globes, 17 December 2025. https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-elbits-mystery-23b-customer-named-as-uae-report-1001529452
[11] Oded Yaron, “The Israeli Air Defense Systems Protecting Cyprus, the UAE, and Azerbaijan from the Iranian Offensive,” Haaretz, 8 March 2026 (in Hebrew). https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/security/2026-03-08/ty-article/.premium/0000019c-cc8e-d7ec-a59c-eccf0c190000?gift=8ae28045d9cd409bba744101c4c96172
[13] Joshua Krasna, “Relations Between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain: Five Years to the Abraham Accords, Two Years to October 7,” Tel Aviv Notes, Moshe Dayan Center, 17 November 2025. https://dayan.org/content/relations-between-israel-and-uae-and-bahrain-five-years-abraham-accords-two-years-october-7#_ftn2
[14] Krasna, “Relations Between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain.”
[15] Mohammed Baharoon and Alex Vatanka, “Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath,” Analysis, Middle East Institute, 12 August 2026. https://mei.edu/publication/gulf-arabs-fear-israel-becoming-goliath/
[16] Cathrin Schaer, “Iran war destabilizes Middle East politics,” DW.com, 3 March 2026. https://www.dw.com/en/iran-war-destabilizes-middle-east-politics/a-76250371
[17] According to sources in the Gulf contacted during the war.
[18] Ibid.
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