“Sword Dance:" Can Israel Still Advance Normalization With Saudi Arabia?
The October 7 War paused the rapprochement between Israel and the Kingdom. Though the Saudis are still interested in pursuing normalization, the past year has made it clear that this goal cannot be pursued before Israel advances the Palestinian issue, even if only at the performative level

Secretary of State Blinken and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, April 29, 2024 |Official State Department photo by Chuck Kennedy (public domain)
This article seeks to examine the impact of the October 7 War on Saudi Arabia and to suggest avenues for renewing the dialogue between Israel and the Kingdom. The article begins by presenting Saudi Arabia’s social-political vision immediately prior to the war. It will then proceed to outline, in general terms, its views toward Israel and the Palestinian issue.
Finally, because the War effectively took normalization off the agenda – at least in the near future – this article will attempt to clarify how Israel can nevertheless pursue a political discourse with the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites and the world’s most important oil exporter during this challenging time.
The author seeks to propose ways to renew this discourse, primarily through creating a common vision for the Gaza Strip over the coming decades; strengthening religious discourse between the Jewish establishment and its Muslim counterpart in Saudi Arabia; holding indirect discussions on shared challenges, chief among them the Houthi threat; and by minimizing public discourse in Israel on the subject until the two parties can formulate and agree upon joint principles.
Saudi Arabia: Vision Versus Reality
The outbreak of the October 7 War caught Saudi Arabia was at the height of a comprehensive process of change in its political worldview, which occurred alongside fundamental economic and social changes. The political and security challenges of the past decade – the unsuccessful attempts to isolate Qatar in 2017 through a sweeping boycott by Sunni countries, to militarily defeat the Houthis in Yemen, and to reduce the Iranian threat in the region – led Riyadh to adopt a new political concept. According to this new geopolitical outlook, political discourse with all actors can and should be promoted to ease tensions in the region.[1]
The Kingdom spearheaded a reconciliation policy toward countries it had avoided declaring ties with for decades, chief among them Israel, Iran, and Syria. Saudi Arabia even worked to advance reconciliation with its immediate neighbors, primarily Qatar, as part of its efforts to establish a new Gulf dialogue. It was thus that in June 2023, for example, the Kingdom expressed its support for renewing Qatar’s diplomatic representation in the United Arab Emirates and vice versa.[2]
The decline in the status and influence of traditional actors, chiefly the Wahhabi religious scholars, strengthened Riyadh's message to the world about authentic political change
This novel political vision was accompanied by an internal change that allowed for dialogue with political actors with whom Saudi Arabia sought to strengthen its ties. The decline in the status and influence of traditional actors who for decades shaped the Kingdom, chiefly the Wahhabi religious scholars, strengthened its message to the world about authentic political change.
This change took place after Saudi Arabia spent many decades supporting radical Islamic forces around the world, such as the Salafis and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan; the currents of Islam that promoted antisemitism, which also permeated the Kingdom’s textbooks; and officials who denied any path towards compromise in the fight against the Shi'ite enemy.
From this perspective, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's message about promoting a moderate form of Islam made a regional Islamic alliance suddenly viable. It was greatly reminiscent of the vision of former Saudi King Faisal, who in the 1960s sought to promote the concept of pan-Islamism – a political union of all Muslims under the leadership of Saudi Arabia.[3]
The new Saudi political vision also stems from the changes it seeks to implement to its economy. Warming ties with Iran, for example, can be seen as a step intended to encourage additional OPEC countries to increase domestic oil production. This occurs against the backdrop of an increase in global consumption and amid the Saudi intent to avoid diminishing its own energy reserves, alongside the need for a significant investment in its economy.[4]
Relations with Israel are also seen as a path to strengthen the kingdom's economy by fostering economic cooperation, such as the "Peace Corridor" (known also as the "Peace Highway") stretching by land from the Arab Gulf to Israel, and from there to the ports of the Mediterranean Sea. Another Saudi goal is to solve the kingdom's food security challenges and modernize the country's extensive services sector, which could benefit from Israel's technological capabilities.[5]
The October 7 War caught Saudi Arabia in the midst of an unexpected economic crisis. After economic flagship Aramco, the country’s national energy company, recorded high revenues in 2021 and 2022, it experienced a significant drop in 2023: $123 billion annual, down from $160 billion in the year prior.[6] The global economic slowdown, reflected in the International Energy Agency's prediction that demand for oil in 2024 would increase from 2023 by only one million barrels per day – compared to the 2.1 million barrels projected[7] – created a significant challenge in fulfilling the Saudi government's economic vision.
Saudi Arabia and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Since the establishment of the State of Israel, Saudi Arabia has never seen Israelis as a direct threat to its existence. Nevertheless, Israel was perceived as an actor with the potential to drag the Kingdom into a regional war, as well as an economic crisis, due to Riyadh’s role in the Arab boycott. Above all, the Jewish state was also seen as a confrontational actor in the region – particularly the Palestinian arena – that can lead to heightened domestic tensions aimed at the royal house of Saud.
The Saudi crown prince was recently quoted, for example, as saying that if the dialogue on the Palestinian issue remains stagnant, he may eventually pay the cost of reconciling with Israel with his life – in the same way that President Sadat of Egypt was assassinated in 1981, after signing the peace accords in 1979. On the other hand, against the backdrop of historic threats to the Kingdom from such actors as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the radical Shi’ites in Iran, Israel is seen as an actor with whom building closer ties could prove beneficial – if only to convince the U.S. administration to grant the Kingdom the broader security guarantees it desperately seeks.[8]
Israel is also seen as part of the Saudi vision for a Middle Eastern in which the constructive actors work together to promote regional initiatives, combat radical Islamist forces, and address key regional challenges such as natural disasters, climate change, food security, and economic diversification. This vision also encompasses a military partnership that became apparent during the first Iranian missile attack on Israel in April 2024, which the anti-Iranian axis of states successfully thwarted by cooperating militarily and intelligence-wise.[9]
Contrary to claims that Saudi Arabia is indifferent toward the fate of the Palestinians – due to their past alignment with anti-Saudi forces like Saddam Hussein, and the perception that regional challenges are higher on the Kingdom’s list of priorities – the Palestinian issue has a considerable impact on the Kingdom's domestic discourse.[10]
In this sense, the Saudi approach – formulated immediately after the 1967 Six Day War – was that the solution to the conflict lies in the recognition of two states: one Jewish and one Palestinian.[11] Since the 1960s, Saudi Arabia considers the PLO as the organization that should lead the dialogue with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. This approach has been further strengthened since the rise of Hamas as a political power. Saudi Arabia has treated the Islamist movement as a threat since the 1980s due to its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.
The October 7 War
The October 7 war is viewed in Riyadh as a direct and indirect threat on several levels. In the eyes of the Saudis, the war could harm the many avenues it is trying to advance economically. The conflict in the Red Sea and the prospect of a regional war have raised concerns among senior officials in Riyadh that investors will become hesitant to invest the Kingdom. The war is also viewed as accentuating tensions with Iran, forcing the kingdom into deciding which axis it belongs to – the Western-American axis, or the Arab-Islamic one.
At the same time, talks on a new U.S. security assistance package for the Kingdom, alongside additional economic agreements, further sharpen the need for Saudi Arabia to decide between its alliance with the U.S. and its relations with Iran’s ally, Russia. Saudi Arabia has close ties with Moscow due to their cooperation in OPEC+, whose primary goal is to cut each country’s oil output in order to stabilize the barrel price.[12]
Regionally, the war is also a stark reminder of the threat that the Houthis pose to Saudi Arabia, as well as the need to provide a security response to an issue that has already proven to be beyond the Kingdom’s capacity to resolve. The deterioration of the conflict between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran also increases the chance of a regional war, which could cause sharp fluctuations in the price of oil, damage oil tankers in the Gulf, strengthen the group of countries that are not OPEC members in an era of declining global consumption, and increase the oil output of countries that are not members of the organization.
The war also intensifies internal divisions in the royal house at a time when the heir to the throne has not yet been officially appointed as king. Internal criticism of the economic shakeup and the situation in the Palestinian and regional arenas may increase domestic opposition against bin Salman.
Saudi Arabia's involvement in the reconstruction of Gaza seems far away at this stage due to the lack of a clear political vision on the part of all parties involved
Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia wishes to promote several short- and long-term initiatives to resolve the crisis in Gaza. In the immediate term, it would like to see a ceasefire as soon as possible. Despite Israel’s hopes, it seems that Saudi Arabia will not want to take part in Gaza’s reconstruction until it is clear who will control the Strip when the fighting subsides. Involvement before then – whether during the war, or on the day after the war – will be perceived as a “betrayal” of the Palestinians and the preservation of Riyadh’s role as the region’s “ATM.”
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia would be happy to see a change of government in Gaza in favor of an acceptable Palestinian entity, though it is currently unclear who could realistically assume that position. The aspiration for Saudi Arabia to be involved in the reconstruction process of Gaza seems disconnected from reality at this stage, due to the extensive destruction in the Strip and lack of a clear political vision on the part of all parties involved.
In terms of Israel’s northern front, the Kingdom is satisfied with the weakening of Hezbollah, a movement which it views as undermining stability not just in Lebanon but in the entire region. Therefore, any action that will lead to Hezbollah’s replacement as a military force is welcome in Saudi Arabia’s eyes.
In light of the above, it is clear that despite the complex political situation, Saudi Arabia still has an interest in promoting a political dialogue with Israel. The reasons for this are its understanding of the magnitude of the Iranian threat, the desire to weaken Hezbollah, and the political role it seeks for itself as a major actor in the region – which does not allow it to ignore Israel.
Enabling Political Dialogue
For Riyadh, the first and necessary step on the path toward renewing dialogue with Israel must be begin with the Israeli government presenting a long-term framework for the resolution of the Palestinian issue. However, contrary to what is commonly perceived, such a framework does not require Israel to explicitly specify target dates or make clear statements about the desire to establish a Palestinian state.
Unfortunately, Israel’s public discourse, particularly the political discourse – which tends to announce any upcoming agreement or meetings with senior figures in the royal Saudi house – creates downward pressure on Saudi decision-makers, who are seen as betraying Palestinian interests if they raise the topic of establishing ties with Israel. Arab countries and much of the Saudi public expect immediate advancements on the Palestinian issue before there the Kingdom makes any headway regarding its ties with Israel.
Consequently, this kind of Israeli discourse directly harms the chances of renewing normalization talks between the two countries, which are currently somewhere between an outright freeze and quiet conversations. It is therefore recommended that Israel refrain from publicizing any “achievement” or the holding of any “talks” with the Saudis until full understandings are reached, and the Israeli government announces a political vision for the day after the war in Gaza.
Saudi Arabia can also be expected to be satisfied with a general statement from Israel on a long-term vision for the Palestinians. Such a vision has already been put forward by several researchers from Arab countries with ties to policymakers in the Arab Gulf, who seek to promote a long-term vision such as the “Gaza 2050 Vision.”[13]
In the next stage, Israel must establish joint Israeli, American, Asian and European working groups with Arab Gulf countries, particularly with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (and possibly also Kuwait, whose hawkish stance toward Israel is important in creating trust with the Palestinians), which can help formulate a vision for the day after the war in Gaza. Such a dialogue is already taking place between academics, including between members of the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (which publishes “The Arena” magazine) and their counterparts elsewhere in the region.
Israel must work toward calming tensions on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif through interfaith dialogue
Such a discourse should emphasize that the Gulf states’ contribution will not be confined only to providing economic support or humanitarian aid, but that they are also expected to influence the political and economic rebuilding of Gaza. At the same time, Israel must work toward calming tensions on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif through interfaith dialogue, which must emphasize the maintenance of the status quo at the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The goal of the dialogue will be to alleviate the fears of Saudis – and of Muslims in general – about the building of a new temple, or even the establishment of a synagogue, on the site of the Temple Mount.
From a regional perspective, a joint discourse on the Houthi issue with the U.S., Europe, the Arab Gulf and Asia, could bring Israel and Saudi Arabia together through indirect talks. This is because the issue is tied not only to the Palestinian arena, but mainly to the Houthis’ status as a disruptive actor in the region, and the threat they pose to the economy and stability of neighboring African countries and the Arab Gulf states near them, particularly Oman.[14]
Finally, the conclusion of the U.S.-Saudi dialogue on security guarantees – a critical element of any final agreement with Israel – has continued despite the war. However, the chances of such an agreement being signed between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia without coordination with Israel are low, given the external and domestic pressure on the U.S. administration on the issue.
Finally, Saudi Arabia has gradually come to believe that a true solution for the nuclear threat from Iran can only be a political one, and that a military option is no longer viable. This is not to say that Riyadh has become convinced that there was no longer any possibility of disabling Tehran’s nuclear program militarily,[15] but is a result of its fears of a severe Iranian reaction, similar to the attack carried out against Aramco’s oil facilities in 2019.[16] Ways to jointly address the issue must therefore be found, and could include the tightening of economic sanctions on Tehran by increasing global commitment.
Summary and conclusions
A normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia could have a far-reaching political impact on Israel, particularly in the era after the October 7 War. If signed, it will put the Abraham Accords back on track and rebuild trust anew with countries in the region.
There is no doubt that the war, together with the complex reality in Saudi Arabia today, make it difficult to reach such an agreement. Despite the challenges, however, it seems that both sides have “crossed the Rubicon:” they ultimately want it, and the terms for reaching normalization are already on the table. All that is missing are the right geopolitical conditions to bring the negotiating teams back to the talks. These depend primarily on Israel's statements on the Palestinian issue and the American commitment to providing security guarantees.

Dr. Yossi Man is a research fellow at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, where he leads the Israel-Arab Gulf Program. He also serves as a senior researcher at Bar-Ilan University and a lecturer at the Lauder School of Government at Reichman University. He previously served as head of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University, as well as head of the Middle Eastern Division at Reichman University. His research focuses primarily on society and economy in the Arab Gulf, with a special emphasis on issues related to energy and the integration of artificial intelligence in qualitative studies to evaluate social and economic facets in the region.
Notes:
[1] Tobias Burck, “Kingdom of Change: Saudi Arabia’s Evolving Foreign Policy,” Commentary, RUSI, 5 June 2023. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/kingdom-change-saudi-arabias-evolving-foreign-policy
[2] “Qatar and UAE embassies resume work on Monday,” Reuters, 20 June 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-uae-embassies-resume-work-monday-qatar-foreign-ministry-2023-06-19/
[3] Joseph Mann, “King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser's Revolutionary Ideology,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 48, Issue 5, 2012, pp. 749-764.
[4] Amine Mati and Sidra Rehman, “Saudi Arabia's Economy Grows as it Diversifies,” International Monetary Fund, 28 September 2023. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/09/28/cf-saudi-arabias-economy-grows-as-it-diversifies
[5] Daniel B. Shapiro, “Israeli-Arab cooperation on agriculture, water, and food security starts with building on existing innovations,” Atlantic Council, 31 March 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/israeli-arab-cooperation-on-agriculture-water-and-food-security-starts-with-building-on-existing-innovations/
[6] “Saudi oil giant Aramco's profits dip after record 2022,” DW.com, 10 March 2024. https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-oil-giant-aramcos-profits-dip-after-record-2022/a-68486831
[7] “Oil Market Report - August 2024,” International Energy Agency, August 2024. https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-august-2024
[8] Humeyra Pamuk, Alexander Cornwell and Matt Spetalnick, “US and Saudi Arabia nearing agreement on security pact, sources say,” Reuters, 3 May 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-saudi-arabia-nearing-agreement-security-pact-sources-say-2024-05-02/
[9] Matt Bradley, “An uneasy alliance of Arab states helped defend Israel from Iran. Their resolve may soon be tested,” NBC News, 16 April 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-attack-israel-hamas-war-saudi-arabia-jordan-uae-coalition-rcna147965
[10] Joseph Mann, “Saudi-Palestinian Relations During the Run-Up to and the Aftermath of Black September,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, Issue 4, 2014, pp. 713-724. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.773899
[11] This author's book on the topic will be published next year.
[12] “Saudi Arabia, Russia to maintain 'close coordination' on OPEC+: Kremlin,” S&P Global, 18 July 2024. (link)
[13] Based on conversations Abba Eban Institute staff held with research groups from the Arab Gulf over the past year.
[14] Giorgio Cafiero, “Oman Keeps Trying to Dial Down Tensions in the Middle East,” Stimson Center, 2 February 2024. https://www.stimson.org/2024/oman-tries-to-dial-down-middle-east-tensions/
[15] Ismael Naar, “Iran and Saudi Arabia reap benefits of rapprochement, one year on,” The National, 10 March 2024. https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/saudi-arabia/2024/03/10/saudi-arabia-iran-relations-one-year-on/
[16] Humeyra Pamuk, “Exclusive: US probe of Saudi oil attack shows it came from north – report,” Reuters, 20 December 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-us-probe-of-saudi-oil-attack-shows-it-came-from-north-report-idUSKBN1YN29E/
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