Israel’s Strategic Imperative: Partnering with the UAE and Saudi Arabia on Gaza’s Reconstruction
- Yossi Mann, Gedaliah Afterman, Oded Raanan
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To prevent the reemergence of extremism and ensure Gaza does not once again become a breeding ground for terror, Israel should encourage the constructive involvement of moderate Gulf states’ in reconstruction, governance, and deradicalization efforts. Prioritizing Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain's engagement over the influence of Türkiye and Qatar would strengthen pragmatic regional cooperation and contribute to a more stable Middle East
The cease-fire brokered between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip in early October 2025 has brought a deep sigh of relief among the pragmatic Arab Gulf states. Over the two years since its outbreak, the “Swords of Iron” war – as Israel has dubbed the conflict that erupted on 7 October 2023 – has destabilized the Middle East and hindered efforts to expand the Abraham Accords. For the Gulf leaders who led the drive toward normalization with Israel, the war has even cast doubt on the goals they envisioned when signing the agreements in 2020 – and has strengthened their interest in advancing a vision for the Palestinians.
Several aspects of US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war have nevertheless raised serious concerns among these states regarding the future of the Gaza Strip and the wider region. A key point of contention is the prominent role Türkiye and Qatar have secured in Gaza’s rehabilitation efforts, given their long-standing economic and ideological support for Hamas. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are particularly opposed to the Turkish-Qatari axis, as they reject the political Islam promoted by Ankara and Doha and compete with them for regional influence in the Middle East.
The pro-Islamist Turkish-Qatari axis has not only secured a significant role in Gaza’s affairs, but does so with official US backing
The Gaza Strip – with its volatile security, political, and religious dynamics – is viewed by both regional blocs as a central arena of contest, crucial to advancing their regional influence and respective visions, as well as consolidating favourable domestic public opinion. Yet, it is the pro-Islamist Turkish-Qatari axis that has not only secured a significant role for itself in Gaza’s affairs, but does so with official US backing.[1]
Türkiye and Qatar’s alignment with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and their longstanding support for Hamas raise concerns that their involvement on the ground could enable Hamas’ resurgence and the continued spread of radical religious ideology in Gaza. This could also complicate progress on other regional cooperation initiatives in which both are involved.
To prevent Gaza from once again becoming a platform for terrorism and political Islam, and to reinforce the regional standing of Israel’s key Gulf partners, Israel must make any initiative in Gaza conditional on Saudi and Emirati participation. The pragmatic Gulf states can play a vital role not only in the Strip’s reconstruction but also in shaping a political and economic framework for the region that promotes moderation and cooperation, all while marginalizing destabilizing and Islamist forces. To achieve this, however, Israel must take an active role in promoting the involvement of the Saudi-Emirati axis.
Relationships Under Strain
The impact of the “Swords of Iron” war extends far beyond the Israeli-Palestinian arena and has reverberated worldwide. Among the Arab Gulf states cooperating with Israel – whether openly or secretly – the two-year war between Israel and Hamas has caused significant disruptions.
Gulf states’ leaderships have faced harsh criticism over their ties with Israel, both domestically and internationally. They have also had to contend with the growing influence of the Houthis, Iran’s proxies, in the Arab world. Additionally, the targeting of Qatar – first by Iran during its 12-day war with Israel in June, and then by Israel during a failed strike against Hamas leaders in Doha in September – undermined the Gulf states’ national security.[2]
Though they maintained relations with Israel in the past two years, Arab Gulf states also set clear red lines regarding its wartime conduct
The strikes raised severe concerns among regional capitals: first, regarding the diplomatic-security umbrella provided to them by the U.S., which was meant inter alia to deter attacks such as the one launched by Israel; and second, about the actual effectiveness of the military equipment they purchase from Washington – worth billions of dollars – that failed to intercept missiles fired by Israel.[3]
Despite these challenges, the Arab Gulf states played a pivotal role in ending the war in Gaza and determining the timing of the cease-fire. Qatar led talks with the US, Israel, and Hamas to secure a cease-fire and the release of Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners and detainees held by Israel. Meanwhile, the UAE has become more closely associated with the humanitarian aid sent to Gaza than any other Arab or Muslim state, with images of tents and food trucks widely circulated from the Strip. Although neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE were signatory to the “Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity,” both maintain close ties with Washington and coordinate closely, making their involvement in the negotiations undeniable.
Maintaining Ties, Setting Red Lines
At present, it is difficult to gauge the full impact of the war on Israel’s standing with the UAE and Bahrain. Throughout the conflict, both countries’ leaders maintained a working dialogue with Israel and a “business as usual” approach. For instance, the UAE’s national airline continued operating regular flights to Israel, in contrast to many countries in Europe and Asia. Bahrain’s response was somewhat more significant: the kingdom recalled its ambassador for extended consultations and suspended flights to Israel.[4] Yet Bahrain remained committed to the strategic agreement with Israel and, in August 2025, received the credentials of Israel’s new ambassador to the kingdom.[5]
Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia were also affected. Reports indicate that Israel and Saudi Arabia had reached understandings on a normalization agreement framework prior to the war, but Riyadh froze the initiative after it broke out. In August 2024, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly told American legislators that signing a normalization deal with Israel during the war would put his life at risk, akin to the fate of late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and therefore he (for the time being) refrained from advancing normalization talks.[6]
But while maintaining relations with Israel during the war, the Arab Gulf states also established clear red lines regarding its wartime conduct. Most recently, in September 2025, they strongly opposed the Netanyahu government’s statements about annexing parts of the West Bank and declaring Israeli sovereignty over the territories.[7] Reports suggest that Israel was taken aback by the forceful response form the Gulf and subsequently put the sovereignty initiative on ice. Such backlash highlights the Gulf states’ “red lines” and their commitment to the Palestinians. But it also illustrates their influence over both Washington and the Israeli government, which recognizes the significant importance of its ties with Gulf partners.
The sovereignty issue became even thornier when a related bill passed a preliminary reading in the Knesset on 22 October 2025, without support from Netanyahu’s Likud party (with the exception of MK Yuli Edelstein).[8] In an official statement, the UAE condemned the vote as “a dangerous escalation and a blatant violation of international law, undermining efforts to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the region.”[9] Several other Arab and Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, issued similar condemnations.[10]
However, the strongest criticism came from the United States: Vice President JD Vance, who was in Israel at the time of the vote, called it “a very stupid political stunt” and said that he “personally” took “some insult.” The following day, President Trump also promptly stated that “Israel is not going to do anything with the West Bank.”[11] In response, Netanyahu reportedly ordered a halt to any sovereignty-related legislation until further notice.[12]
In this context, the end of the war and Trump’s statements about his vision for the “day after” in Gaza significantly eased tensions in Abu Dhabi, Manama, and Riyadh, suggesting hope exists for a positive shift in regional dynamics – even if not in popular public opinion.
Türkiye and Qatar have extensive experience supporting non-state proxy groups and transforming them into influential regional actors
However, from Israel’s perspective, the war’s official objectives were not achieved. Most notably, Hamas continues to act as the de facto ruler of the areas of the Gaza Strip from which the IDF withdrew (about 47 percent of the territory) and shows no proclivity towards disarmament.
Moreover, in mid-October 2025, reports indicated that Hamas is involved in shaping the “technocratic government” which is slated to govern the Strip, with the quiet consent of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Egypt (and presumably, out of necessity, also Israel).[13] The involvement of Türkiye and Qatar in Gaza further raises concerns about the potential resurgence of Hamas under their patronage.[14]
This situation amplifies Israel’s emerging compounded challenge: Qatar’s vast economic and ideological influence coupled with Türkiye’s significant military and international stature. Both countries maintain close and expanding ties with the US and enjoy support from the Trump administration, including the president personally.
Importantly, Türkiye and Qatar also have extensive experience supporting non-state proxy groups and transforming them into influential regional actors, as Qatar has done for decades across multiple arenas and as Türkiye is currently doing in Libya.[15] Furthermore, Ankara has been involved in East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount in recent years through charitable organizations.[16] In our assessment, these actions reflect a strategic effort to establish a presence within the region’s holy sites, which are central to a country seeking to position itself as the nascent leader of the Muslim world.
The “Day After” is Already Here
Israel and the Gulf states share a common interest in limiting the influence and involvement of Qatar and Türkiye in the Gaza Strip, and more broadly, across the Middle East. A strong Turkish-Qatari axis could enable Hamas to rebuild its military capabilities, restrict Israel’s freedom of action in counterterrorism operations, and allow the Islamist organization to continue spreading its radical ideology within the Strip.
Although both countries are expected to be involved in Gaza under Trump’s plan,[17] additional measures are needed to ensure that moderate forces – those promoting normalization and regional integration, who have themselves undergone religious de-radicalization, and who demonstrated during the war a commitment to both Gaza’s rehabilitation and to relations with Israel – expand their role in the Strip in the coming months and years. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are clearly the partners Israel seeks for such an endeavour.
To this end, in planning Gaza’s demilitarization, rehabilitation and reconstruction, Israel must insist on a clear separation between the administrative element, responsible for managing civilian rehabilitation, and the policing or peacekeeping forces which will be deployed to the Strip. The military element could be potentially staffed by troops from Azerbaijan or Indonesia, as previously proposed,[18] alongside Palestinian forces. In contrast, the administrative work should be placed under the responsibility and control of the Saudi-Emirati axis, reflecting their management expertise, strategic vision, and regional influence.
Israel must now convey to all parties – both publicly and behind closed doors – that the UAE is its primary partner in Gaza’s rehabilitation and shares the vision for the “day after” in the Strip. The Netanyahu government should take concrete steps to reinforce the UAE’s role as a key influencer, including providing “quick wins” in the Palestinian arena that elevate the Emiratis’ standing in the eyes of other regional actors and the U.S. For example, their active role in humanitarian efforts in Gaza, which earned recognition across the Arab world and the West during the war, could be further expanded and deepened.
At the regional level, strengthening partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their allies could help create a broader Middle Eastern framework that fosters constructive cooperation. There is no need to reinvent the wheel: the IMEC initiative (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), involving the U.S., Israel, India, and the Gulf states – whose formal foundations were laid out at the G20 meeting in September 2023 (with Israel mentioned but not a signatory) – could serve as a basis for coordinated efforts in Gaza. This approach would simultaneously strengthen the moderate and pragmatic axis in the Middle East and deepen Israel’s engagement with the region alongside its allies and partners, all under US leadership.
IMEC could, for example, be leveraged to advance energy and security infrastructure projects – not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank under the PA. Furthermore, placing Gaza’s rehabilitation efforts under the IMEC umbrella would provide them with pro-Western international legitimacy and American sponsorship. Such an initiative could also undermine attempts by the Turkish-Qatari axis to establish an alternative trade route bypassing Israel, such as a revived Hejaz railway project.[19]
One important caveat remains, though: both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have made it clear that for them to fully commit to engaging in Gaza and work towards shared interests, Israel must present a vision for Palestinian statehood. Given the current makeup of its government and the unpopularity of such an idea in public opinion, it is unclear how Israel can overcome, or bypass, such a substantial obstacle.
Conclusion
Israel reluctantly accepted the involvement of Türkiye and Qatar in the Gaza Strip as part of Trump’s peace plan; however, this does not mean it must allow them to entrench their influence. Strategic and constructive engagement with the Saudi-Emirati axis can constrain the actions of Doha and Ankara and ensure that countries cooperating with Israel, rather than opposing it, play a role in shaping Gaza’s future and its postwar political model of governance. However, if Israel fails to act swiftly, it risks having limited influence over developments in the territory, while facing unfriendly rivals far stronger – militarily, economically, and diplomatically – than it is accustomed to.
In this scenario, one cannot rule out the possibility that Hamas could rebuild its military strength under the patronage of the Turkish-Qatari axis, while Israel’s freedom to act against it is constrained by the Trump administration (as was indeed reported in mid-October) and by concerns about possible damage to Türkish and Qatari assets in the Strip.[20]
It the PA indeed returns to Gaza, it is difficult to predict how significant its presence will be with Türkiye and Qatar as the dominant forces there
Moreover, the question of external influence in Gaza is closely tied to the identity of the entity which will control the territory in the long term. Unlike Hamas, the PA, which is slated to re-enter the Strip according to the Trump plan, traditionally enjoys support from the moderate Gulf states. Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict how Ramallah’s return to Gaza will unfold – if and when it occurs – with Türkiye and Qatar as the dominant forces on the ground.
Promoting a deep involvement by the Saudi-Emirati axis and expanding its influence is expected to have a positive impact in two key areas. First, an administrative mechanism managed by pragmatic countries can support the efforts of military forces deployed in the Strip to prevent Hamas from regaining civil control, thereby limiting the continued radicalization of the population. Second, the presence of actors from the Saudi-Emirati axis is also likely to facilitate the return of the PA to the territory (if the Israeli government agrees, or is compelled to acquiesce, to such a development).
Although phase two of the new political and security arrangement for the Gaza Strip has not yet been finalized, the current situation suggests that the involvement of moderate Arab states could grant Israel greater freedom of action in countering hostile activities, prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military strength, and hinder the further spread of its radical doctrine in the Strip.
These are clear interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their close allies, creating a potential convergence of interests with Israel.
Dr. Yossi Mann is a senior research fellow at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations, where he leads the Israel-Arab Gulf Program. He is a researcher at Bar-Ilan University and a lecturer at the School of Government at Reichman University.
Dr. Gedaliah Afterman is head of the Israel-Asia Policy Program at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations at Reichman University.
Oded Raanan is the Editor-in-Chief of "The Arena" magazine.
Notes
* The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoW endorsement.
[1] KAN News, "Qatar and Türkiye Arrive in Gaza? The Islamist Axis's Great Victory," KAN, 19 October 2025 (in Hebrew). https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan/news-series/p-11572/s1/961701/
[2] Sean Seddon and Gabriela Pomeroy, “What we know about Iran's attack on US base in Qatar,” BBC, 24 June 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdjxdgjpd48o; Josef Federman and Jon Gambrell, “Israeli strike in Qatar targets Hamas leaders as they weigh Gaza ceasefire proposal,” AP News, 9 September 2025. https://apnews.com/article/qatar-explosion-doha-e319dd51b170161372442831a8023db5
[3] Mohammed Baharoon and Alex Vatanka, “Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath,” Analysis, Middle East Institute, 12 August 2025. https://www.mei.edu/publications/gulf-arabs-fear-israel-becoming-goliath ; Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, “Are Arab nations going to impose real costs on Israel?” New Atlantacist, The Atlantic Council, 18 September 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/are-arab-nations-going-to-impose-real-costs-on-israel/
[4] National Communication Centre (NCC), Bahrain's Ambassador to Israel returned to the Kingdom, and the Israeli Ambassador previously departed for his country, National Communication Centre (Kingdom of Bahrain), 2 November 2023. https://www.ncc.gov.bh/en/article/national-communication-centre-of-bahrain-bahrains-ambassador-to-israel-returned-to-the-kingdom-and-the-israeli-ambassador-previously-departed-for-his-country; Mohammed Hamad, “Bahrain says envoy to Israel returned home, Israel says ties stable,” Reuters, 2 November 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bahrain-parliament-says-envoy-israel-returned-home-israel-says-ties-stable-2023-11-02/
[5] Reuters & ToI Staff, "Bahrain receives credentials of Israel’s new ambassador to the Gulf kingdom," The Times of Israel, 28 August 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/bahrain-receives-credentials-of-israels-new-ambassador-to-the-gulf-kingdom/
[6] Nahal Toosi, “MBS says he is at risk in pursuit of Saudi–Israel deal,” Politico Magazine, 14 August 2024. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/08/14/saudi-prince-mbs-israel-deal-00173898
[7] Roi Kais, "Saudi Source: 'Annexation of West Bank Will Likely End Chances for Normalization," KAN, 7 September 2025 (in Hebrew). https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/948769/; "It's Highly Extraordinary:' The Threat That Caught Israel by Surprise – and the Warnings That Preceded It," YNET, 6 September 2025 (in Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/h1pnyofqxl
[8] Amir Ettinger, "Proposal to Asset Sovereignty over West Bank Passes Preliminary Reading in Knesset," YNET, 22 October 2025 (in Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bjxwvburlg
[9] UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “UAE Condemns Israeli Knesset’s Approval of Two Bills Seeking to Impose Sovereignty Over Occupied West Bank,” 23 November 2025. https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2025/10/23/23-10-2025-uae-israel
[10] “Saudi Arabia, Arab and Muslim Countries Condemn Israel's West Bank Annexation Bills,” Al-Shaq Al-Awsat, 23 October 2025. https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5200763-saudi-arabia-arab-and-muslim-countries-condemn-israels-west-bank-annexation-bills
[11] Jacob Magid, Ariela Karmel, and ToI Staff, “Trump says ‘Israel not going to do anything with the West Bank’ as US fumes over annexation vote,” Times of Israel, 24 October 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-says-israel-not-going-to-do-anything-with-the-west-bank-as-us-fumes-over-annexation-vote/
[12] Michael Hauser Tov and Noa Shpigel, "Netanyahu Orders Halt to All Proposals on Sovereignty Over West Bank Until Further Notice," Ha'aretz, 23 October 2025 (in Hebrew). https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2025-10-23/ty-article/.premium/0000019a-113b-d1c4-a99f-73bbbd280000
[13] Elior Levi, "Exclusive: Hamas Participating in Talks for Establishing Technocrat Government to Run Gaza," KAN, 21 October 2025. https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/962098/
[14] Yoav Zitun, “Qatar’s money in Gaza raises alarm: IDF fears aid will rebuild Hamas, not homes,” Ynetnews, 12 October 2025. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/sye0vrdple
[15] See for example: "Saudi Arabia and Qatar funding Syrian rebels," Reuters, 23 June 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/saudi-arabia-and-qatar-funding-syrian-rebels-idUSBRE85M078/; Wolfram Lacher, “Invisible Occupation: Turkey and Russia in Libya,” Megatrends spotlight 35, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 10 July 2024. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/mta-spotlight-35-invisible-occupation-turkey-and-russia-in-libya
[16] Lidor Sultan, "Jerusalem Municipality Provides Benefits for Türkish Charity Run by Anti-Israeli Groups," Israel Hayom, 25 December 2024 (in Hebrew). https://www.israelhayom.co.il/news/local/article/17031839 ; "Jordan, Saudi Arabia, PA warn Israel of Erdogan's Jerusalem agenda: report," i24News, 28 June 2018. https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/178225-180628-jordan-saudi-arabia-pa-warn-israel-of-erdogan-s-jerusalem-agenda-report
[17] Reuters, “Qatar would contribute troops to Gaza peacekeeping force, Trump says sitting next to emir,” Jerusalem Post, 25 October 2025. https://www.jpost.com/american-politics/article-871587; AFP, Ankara, “Turkish experts to help find hostage bodies in Gaza: Ministry sources,” Al-Arabiya English, 16 October 2025. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/10/16/turkish-experts-to-help-find-hostage-bodies-in-gaza-ministry-sources
[18] Agencies, "Not Only Israel's Greatest Ally: These Three Countries Seek To Get Involved in Gaza," Ma'ariv, 16 OCtober 2025 (in Hebrew). https://www.maariv.co.il/news/world/article-1241998
[19] Ragip Soylu in Ankara and MEE staff, “Turkey to restore parts of historic Hejaz Railway in Syria,” Middle East Eye, 24 December 2024. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-restore-parts-hejaz-railway-syria
[20] Suleiman Maswade, "Israeli Sources: 'The US Intervenes in Everything Regarding Gaza – It's Like [We're] A Vassal State," KAN, 21 October 2025. https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/politic/962425
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