AI-Mediated Warfare and the Battle for Legitimacy
Why Israel Needs a Diplomatic Framework for Responsible Military AI
Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming a central feature of contemporary military innovation and warfare. It is also a growing diplomatic challenge. As AI is given a larger role in modern warfare, it will inevitably face growing legal, operational, and technical scrutiny. At the same time, states understandably resist disclosing the systems’ operational parameters and the classified particulars of their use on the battlefield.
The result is an asymmetry between innovation and transparency which, if tipped too strongly towards secrecy, creates its own risk. When states do not provide a credible public account of how they use military AI, they allow others – among them adversaries – to fill the narrative gap. Eventually, this can lead to a strategic problem of legitimacy.
This article argues that by publicly articulating the principles, safeguards, and oversight mechanisms governing military AI, governments can reduce the space for unfounded accusations and sustain international legitimacy, without disclosing classified details of battlefield use. Israel’s use of military AI systems in the wars it has fought since 7 October 2023 has generated intense international criticism, making it a highly relevant case study.
The Anxiety of Automation
Military AI is especially vulnerable to public anxiety because it is not perceived merely as another military technology, but one which carries fears of automation, surveillance, dehumanization, machine decision-making, and the erosion of human responsibility. In war, these fears become sharper because the stakes involve civilian harm, lethal force, and state violence.
In a fast-moving information environment shaped by social media, podcasts, and alternative media, selective narratives about this technology can take hold in international public opinion before the relevant facts are clear. States might be judged not only by how AI-enabled systems are governed internally, but by how their use is framed, interpreted, and absorbed into broader political narratives. This is especially true for democracies at war.
Democracies need serious processes of review, responsibility, and restraint regarding military use of AI – and also ways to make those processes visible
Under such circumstances, states may devise sophisticated military technologies but neglect developing the diplomatic language necessary to publicly explain the principles, safeguards, and institutional responsibilities that govern them. In such cases, military AI may become internationally visible before the public understands how it is bounded, who remains responsible, and what standards distinguish legitimate from illegitimate use.
Israel illustrates this challenge with particular clarity. Since the attacks of 7 October 2023, the country has fought a multi-front war under severe operational pressure. At the same time, it has faced intense international scrutiny over its use of AI-enabled military systems, especially following reports concerning systems such as “Lavender” and “Habsora,” also known as “The Gospel.”[1] These reports portrayed Israeli military AI not merely as a decision-support capability but as a mechanism enabling industrialized targeting,[2] algorithmically-generated kill lists,[3] and diminished human oversight in decisions involving the use of lethal force.[4]
The significance of these reports therefore lies not only in the allegations themselves, but upon the evidentiary threshold and the degree to which they shaped the subsequent public conversation. In time, they became incorporated into broader interpretive frameworks shaping global perceptions of Israeli military AI, often linking it to dehumanization,[5] technological experimentation,[6] and even genocide.[7]
This article does not attempt to adjudicate every allegation concerning specific systems, nor does it argue that Israel should expose classified operational details. Some claims deserve serious scrutiny; others are difficult to verify or rest on sweeping, unverifiable assumptions. Likewise, the relevant standard in employing these systems is not perfection, but the demonstrated willingness to examine mistakes, strengthen safeguards, and improve the institutions that govern the use of force.
The broader point is that democracies need both internal governance and outward-facing strategic communication. They need serious processes of review, responsibility, and restraint regarding military use of AI, and they need ways to make those processes visible without exposing classified capabilities.
A diplomatic vocabulary for military innovation
Because military AI touches upon concerns that extend beyond the battlefield, including human dignity, automation, surveillance, opacity, and responsibility, it requires not only technical governance, but also a diplomatic vocabulary capable of addressing the fears it uniquely amplifies. Innovative military technologies therefore require innovative diplomacy, lest others fill in the gaps.[8]
Israel’s experience in recent years should therefore be understood not only as a case study in military innovation, but also as an early warning for democracies that field AI-enabled and other emerging military technologies in active conflicts. In AI-mediated warfare, legitimacy will increasingly depend on managing three related and mutually reinforcing gaps:
The communication gap between the limits of what democratic governments can explain about these systems, and what the public demand to know.
The narrative gap that emerges when limited explanations allows others to define the meaning of military AI in the public sphere.
The legitimacy gap that follows when those narratives harden into public judgments affecting diplomacy, partnerships, public opinion, and international standing.
These gaps are not strictly linear. However, weak communication often creates room for hostile narratives; narratives make later explanations harder to accept; and legitimacy costs, once they emerge, further constrain diplomacy.
The Israel Case Study: AI Transformation and the Missing Diplomatic Layer
Israel’s military AI transformation did not begin after the attacks of 7 October 2023. Israeli officials and analysts had already described Operation “Guardian of the Walls” in Gaza in May 2021 as the first “AI war,” highlighting the role of machine learning, intelligence fusion, and data-driven targeting in military operations.[9]
Since then, the institutional architecture has become more visible. The establishment of an AI and Autonomy Administration within the Ministry of Defense, the Nagel Committee’s attention to defense modernization, and the broader National AI Program, all point in the same direction: Israel increasingly treats artificial intelligence as a strategic capability rather than a narrow technical tool.[10]
The Ministry of Defense’s AI and Autonomy Administration, established within the Directorate of Defense, Research & Development (DDR&D/MAFAT), reflects an effort to organize military branches, technological units, academia, defense industries, and startups around AI and autonomous capabilities.[11] Hebrew-language reporting has offered a more operational picture, describing AI-enabled systems designed to support sensing, target detection, intelligence fusion, autonomous platforms, and faster decision cycles.[12]
Israel’s military AI transformation has become a diplomatic challenge it can no longer ignore
The Nagel Committee and the National AI Program place these developments within a broader national-security context. AI is treated not only as a battlefield capability, but as part of Israel’s effort to strengthen preparedness, technological independence, innovation capacity, and national resilience after October 7th.[13] In this sense, military AI belongs to a larger Israeli reassessment of force build-up, economy, and national power.[14]
Yet the international context has changed sharply in the past three years. Reports concerning “Lavender” and “Habsora” raised serious questions about civilian harm, accountability, and compliance with international humanitarian law in Gaza. These reports relied heavily on anonymous sources, partial descriptions of classified military processes, and interpretations that remain difficult to verify independently.
Subsequent legal and military analyses reached more qualified conclusions.[15] They warned that public discussion often misunderstood both military targeting processes and the realistic capabilities of AI.[16] But these alternative interpretations received far less public attention than the original allegations.
This is where Israel’s military AI transformation becomes a diplomatic challenge it cannot ignore. Israel is building the architecture of AI-enabled security, but it has not yet built an equally visible public framework for communicating responsibility, restraint, and democratic oversight. Without that effort, Israeli military AI will continue to be interpreted largely through external narratives, which will continue to chip away at the legitimacy of its use, and strengthen those voices who dispute Israel’s right to exist.
The three gaps eroding legitimacy
1. The Communication Gap: What Cannot Be Seen
The first challenge is a communication gap. Israel’s military AI transformation was not entirely hidden, but much of the relevant discussion took place in Hebrew-only, military, and defense circles. For many international audiences, however, the first encounter with Israeli military AI came instead through investigative reporting, activist campaigns, technology-sector protests, and highly publicized controversies.
This matters because secrecy and silence are not the same. Naturally, Israel cannot disclose intelligence sources, targeting methods, or classified capabilities. But democratic governments can still explain governance. They can describe, at the appropriate level of generality, who bears responsibility, what legal frameworks apply, what kinds of review are required, how uncertainty is handled, and what institutional mechanisms exist for oversight.
Such explanations will not eliminate criticism; they can, however, shift the debate from accusation to standards. Without them, a capability designed to support intelligence analysis may be portrayed as “industrialized killing,” and a safeguard may be treated as if it does not exist, when in practice it is classified.
The communication gap therefore becomes more than a public-relations problem. It becomes a structural vulnerability in the legitimacy of military innovation.
2. The Narrative Gap: How Silence is Interpreted
Communication gaps do not fully explain why some interpretations gain traction in public opinion while others do not. The deeper challenge is narrative: political actors compete not only over facts, but over the meaning assigned to those facts. Once a narrative takes hold, it shapes which sources appear credible, which explanations sound plausible, and how later information is received.[17]
In Israel’s case, and recently also in the US’s war in Iran, these general anxieties intersect with existing narratives of delegitimization.[18] Questions that might otherwise focus on governance, human oversight, legal review, or operational effectiveness can become embedded in broader claims about alleged war crimes committed in Gaza and elsewhere. When military AI is linked to dehumanization, technological experimentation, or genocide, the debate can shift quickly.
As AI becomes more central to warfare, states will need to govern not only the technology, but also the interpretive environment in which that technology is judged
This does not mean that all criticism is unfounded, nor that narratives emerge only from misunderstanding. Political commitments, humanitarian concerns, legal disputes, and the conduct of war itself all shape interpretation. The point is that narratives have consequences; once established, they shape how future information is received and which explanations are accepted or dismissed.[19]
The result is a widening gap between operational discussions inside military institutions and the public narratives through which those operations are understood internationally. As AI becomes more central to warfare, states will need to govern not only the technology, but also the interpretive environment in which that technology is judged.
3. The Legitimacy Gap: When Narrative Deficits Become Costs
Communication and narrative gaps matter because they produce political consequences. In contemporary conflict, legitimacy is not determined only by battlefield outcomes or formal legal assessments. It is also shaped by public perception across governments, universities, corporations, media organizations, cultural institutions, civil society networks, and international organizations.[20]
Israel’s experience since October 7th shows how narratives surrounding military AI can travel far beyond the technologies themselves. Reporting on “Lavender,” “Habsora,” and “Project Nimbus”[21] entered broader debates about Israeli military conduct. In some arenas, they became absorbed into broader anti-Zionist discourse, including rhetoric that challenges the legitimacy of the State of Israel.[22] As these narratives spread, they influenced technology-sector protests,[23] academic discussions in prestigious and influential universities,[24] and cultural boycotts.[25]
The strategic implications are serious. The University of Maryland’s Critical Issues Poll found in 2025 that Americans had become more sympathetic to Palestinians than Israelis, with polling indicating greater acceptance of claims that Israeli military actions constitute, or resemble, genocide.[26] In the United States, recent polling suggests declining sympathy toward Israel, especially among younger audiences and political independents.[27] Whether such perceptions are accurate is not the central point here; the strategic reality is that perceptions influence legitimacy, which in turn influences public support, partnerships, and academic cooperation.[28]
This is not merely a communications problem; it is a strategic challenge. When governments fail to participate effectively in the conversations through which military innovation is understood, cutting-edge systems can generate operational advantages while also creating legitimacy pressures.
From Reactive Defense to Norm Entrepreneurship
In the past three years, Israel has gained hard-earned experience with AI-mediated warfare under conditions of an active, multi-front conflict. During this time, it has discovered that military AI is becoming an object of diplomacy as well as warfare. For this reason, Israel should move from reactive rebuttal to proactive norm entrepreneurship.[29] The purpose is not to defend every policy decision or dismiss every criticism, but to help shape the standards, institutions, and public vocabulary through which the use of military AI is evaluated.
If others define that experience only through accusation, it will deepen Israel’s legitimacy crisis. In contrast, if Israel actively helps shape standards for responsible military AI, the same experience can become a basis for leadership.
Below are three recommendations to assist the Israeli government in turning Israel’s military AI experience into a diplomatic asset:
1. Explain governance, not only technology
Israel should explain the broader context within which military AI is developed and used. This does not demand disclosure of classified systems or operational details. Rather, it requires a clearer account of governance structures, legal safeguards, human responsibility, review processes, testing, accountability, and institutional oversight.
Public debates often focus on specific systems and controversies. Israel should shift the discussion toward the processes and constraints that govern those systems. Democratic legitimacy depends not only on what technologies can do, but on how their use is reviewed, limited, and justified.
2. Develop a public framework for responsible military AI
Israel should consider developing a public-facing legal and diplomatic framework, or principles document, on responsible military AI. To date, Israel’s most detailed public explanations have been largely reactive. After the “Lavender” and “Habsora” reporting in 2024, the IDF issued statements emphasizing that these tools support intelligence analysts, do not autonomously select targets, and cannot replace human judgment in the targeting process.[30] These clarifications matter. But they are not the same as a public doctrine.
Israel already has a useful precedent in the cyber field. In 2021, then-Deputy Attorney General Roy Schöndorf published Israel’s position on key legal and practical issues concerning the application of international law to cyber operations.[31] That document clarified Israel’s legal approach to a technologically distinctive domain without disclosing operational capabilities.
A comparable framework for military AI could serve a similar function. Such a document would explain, at the appropriate level of generality, Israel’s position on human responsibility, legal review, accountability, system testing, domain limits, uncertainty, safeguards against overreliance, and the relationship between AI-enabled support and human judgment.
The goal should not be reassurance alone; it should be standard-setting. Israel should explain what responsible military AI requires, what it does not permit, and what questions remain unresolved. That would allow Israel to enter global debates not only as a defendant in controversies, but as a contributor to emerging norms.
3. Lead and convene democratic dialogue on military AI
Israel should not wait to be invited into existing conversations – it should help create them. Existing international forums on responsible military AI are valuable, but they do not fully address the challenges democracies face when integrating AI into military decision-making under conditions of active conflict.[32]
This will not be easy. Israel already faces diplomatic resistance, reputational challenges, and efforts to exclude it from international forums.[33] Those challenges make leadership more difficult, but also more necessary. A recurring forum on responsible military innovation, hosted by Israel with democratic partners, could bring together military practitioners, AI researchers, legal scholars, policymakers, technology experts, and civil society representatives.
Israel should build durable channels for democratic AI governance and position itself as a contributor to responsible military AI, rather than a subject of controversy
Such a forum should not function as a public-relations exercise. It should address hard issues: When AI should not be used; What meaningful human control requires; How uncertainty should be handled; How operational speed affects legal judgment; How democratic oversight can operate under conditions of secrecy; and how battlefield lessons can inform international standards.
The broader aim is institutional. Israel should build durable channels for democratic AI governance through research networks, academic partnerships, military-to-military exchanges, public-facing explainers, and recurring policy forums. Internationally, this would position the country as a contributor to responsible military AI rather than merely a subject of controversy. Domestically, it would demonstrate that questions of accountability, human judgment, legitimacy, and restraint are being taken seriously.
Conclusion: Legitimacy as a Strategic Resource
The future of military AI will not be determined by technology alone. It will also be shaped by narratives, institutions, legal frameworks, diplomatic processes, and public judgment. In this environment, legitimacy is not secondary to military power. It is part of it.
For Israel, the challenge is therefore not simply to defend itself after controversies arise. It is to move from reaction to initiative and from defensive communication to norm entrepreneurship. Its experience in AI-mediated warfare comes from hard lessons imposed by a hostile strategic environment and a multi-front war. Those lessons should not produce silence, but leadership.
Israel need not claim perfection in order to claim a voice. No democracy that has fought a war could meet that standard. Precisely because Israel has been forced to confront the future of war under fire, it has both the right and the responsibility to help define the principles, institutions, and legitimacy frameworks through which military AI will be judged.
Dr. Kasey Barr is a Research Fellow at Reichman University’s Rubenstein Center for Constitutional Challenges and Director of its Program on Human Rights in the Digital Frontier. Her research examines human judgment and accountability in AI-enabled decision-making, with a focus on the democratic governance of emerging technologies.
Notes
[1] Yuval Abraham, "'Lavender': The AI Machine Directing Israel's Bombing Spree in Gaza." +972 Magazine. April 3, 2024. https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/. +972 Magazine, "Podcast: Uncovering the Inner Workings of an AI Genocide," December 4, 2025, https://www.972mag.com/podcast-uncovering-the-inner-workings-of-an-ai-genocide/
[2] Bethan McKernan and Harry Davies, “'The Machine Did It Coldly': Israel Used AI to Identify 37,000 Hamas Targets,” The Guardian, April 3, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-gaza-ai-database-hamas-airstrikes.
[3] Amy Goodman, interview with Yuval Abraham, “Lavender & Where's Daddy: How Israel Used AI to Form Kill Lists & Bomb Palestinians in Their Homes,” Democracy Now!, April 5, 2024, https://www.democracynow.org/2024/4/5/israel_ai
[4] Sibel Düz, "Gaza as a Testing Ground: Israel's AI Warfare," SETA Foundation, July 3, 2025, https://www.setav.org/en/gaza-as-a-testing-ground-israels-ai-warfare
[5] Kassidy De Maio, "The Dehumanization of ISR: Israel's Use of Artificial Intelligence in Warfare," Georgetown Security Studies Review. n.d. https://gssr.georgetown.edu/the-forum/regions/mena/the-dehumanization-of-isr-israels-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-warfare/.
[6] Cade Metz, Adam Satariano, and Sheera Frenkel, “Israel’s War in Gaza Has Become a Laboratory for A.I. Warfare,” New York Times, April 25, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/25/technology/israel-gaza-ai.html; and Düz, "Gaza as a Testing Ground.”
[7] Leila Katibah, "The Genocide Will Be Automated: Israel, AI, and the Future of War," Middle East Report Online (MERIP), October 2024, https://www.merip.org/2024/10/the-genocide-will-be-automated-israel-ai-and-the-future-of-war/; and +972 Magazine, "PODCAST: Uncovering the Inner Workings of an AI Genocide."
[8] On the influence of early reporting on subsequent academic framing, see: Chris Hables Gray, AI, Sacred Violence, and War: The Case of Gaza, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2025, vii, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-81501-0. Gray writes that “+972 Magazine reporting on Gospel, Lavender, and the Where’s Daddy programs was extraordinarily helpful.”
[9] Anna Ahronheim, “Israel’s Operation against Hamas Was the World’s First AI War,” Jerusalem Post, May 27, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/gaza-news/guardian-of-the-walls-the-first-ai-war-669371; Leehe Friedman, “Military Artificial Intelligence and Israel’s National Security: A Strategic Game Changer?” Policy Report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, May 2022. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/PR220525_Military-AI-and-Israels-National-Security.pdf; Israel Defense Forces, public materials and statements relating to the “Tnufa” (English: “Momentum”) Strategic Plan, 2019–2022.
[10] Amir Buchbut, “A Lot of Xs: The Ministry of Defense’s AI Revolution,”, Walla News, February 7, 2026, https://news.walla.co.il/item/3814668 (in Hebrew); Israel Ministry of Defense, “Israel MOD Establishes AI and Autonomy Administration,” January 2025, https://mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/israel-mod-establishes-ai-and-autonomy-administration; Nagel Committee, Report of the Committee for Examining the Defense Budget and Force-Building Balance, Jerusalem: Government of Israel, 2025; National Program for Artificial Intelligence, National Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Policy Framework for the State of Israel, Jerusalem: Government of Israel, 2024.
[11] “Israel MOD Establishes AI and Autonomy Administration,” Israel Ministry of Defense, January 2025, https://mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/israel-mod-establishes-ai-and-autonomy-administration. The Ministry describes the Administration as operating under DDR&D/MAFAT and advancing AI and autonomous capabilities across the defense establishment.
[12] Buchbut, “‘Many Xs’.” Walla describes MAFAT’s AI work as aimed at turning platforms such as drones and tanks into intelligent systems capable of identifying operationally relevant signals in complex environments and closing operational loops quickly.
[13] Nagel Committee, Report of the Committee for Examining the Defense Budget and Force-Building Balance; “Recommendations of the Nagel Committee: Rushing Toward the AI Abyss,” Institute for National Security Studies, November 5, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/nagel-committee/. INSS describes the Nagel AI recommendations as a wide-ranging vision for the role of AI in the State of Israel.
[14] National Program for Artificial Intelligence, National Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Policy Framework for the State of Israel, Jerusalem: Government of Israel, 2024; Israel’s National AI Program, https://aiisrael.org.il/
[15] See for example: Michael N. Schmitt, “The Gospel, Lavender, and the Law of Armed Conflict,” Articles of War, Lieber Institute, West Point, June 28, 2024, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/gospel-lavender-law-armed-conflict/
[16] Tal Mimran, Magda Pacholska, Gal Dahan, and Lena Trabucco, “Israel-Hamas 2024 Symposium: Beyond the Headlines: Combat Deployment of Military AI-Based Systems by the IDF,” Articles of War, Lieber Institute, West Point, February 2, 2024, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/beyond-headlines-combat-deployment-military-ai-based-systems-idf/
[17] Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, New York: Routledge, 2013, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315871264.
[18] See: James LaPorta & Camilla Schick, “Anthropic's Claude AI being used in Iran war by U.S. military, sources say,” ABC News, 3 March 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anthropic-claude-ai-iran-war-u-s/
[19] Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the Making of US National Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316218969
[20] On legitimacy as a political and strategic resource in international relations, see: Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,” Ethics & International Affairs 20, no. 4, 2006, pp. 405–437, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00043.x
[21] Project Nimbus is the Israeli government’s cloud-computing project. In 2021, Israel announced that Amazon Web Services and Google had won the first phase of the tender to provide cloud services to the government. See Government of Israel, “The Israeli Government Is Moving to the Cloud: Providers Selected for the First Stage of the Nimbus Project,” May 24, 2021, https://www.gov.il/en/pages/press_24052021. The project later became a focus of public controversy and employee protests because of claims that the cloud and AI services could support Israeli military and security activities. See Billy Perrigo, “Google Contract Shows Deal with Israel Defense Ministry,” Time, April 12, 2024, https://time.com/6966102/google-contract-israel-defense-ministry-gaza-war/
[22] Jonathan Guyer, “How ‘Zionist’ Became a Slur on the US Left,” The Guardian, May 12, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/12/how-zionist-became-a-slur-on-the-us-left; Chris McGreal, “How Pervasive Is Antisemitism on US Campuses? A Look at the Language of the Protests,” The Guardian, May 3, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/may/03/college-gaza-protests-antisemitism.
[23] Andrew Buncombe, “Microsoft Workers Occupy HQ in Protest against Company’s Ties to Israeli Military,” The Guardian, August 20, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/aug/19/microsoft-workers-protest-washington-israel. See also Monica Nickelsburg, “Protestors Occupy Microsoft HQ, Demand It Cut Ties with Israeli Military,” KUOW, August 20, 2025, https://www.kuow.org/stories/protestors-occupy-microsoft-hq-demand-it-cut-ties-with-israeli-military
[24] De Maio, “The Dehumanization of ISR.” “Resisting Big Tech’s Complicity in Genocide: Notes from a Panel Discussion,” Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Cambridge, 2025.
[25] “Boycott Eurovision Until Genocidal Israel Is Banned,” Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, May 15, 2026, https://bdsmovement.net/boycott-eurovision-2026
[26] Shibley Telhami, Americans Are Now More Sympathetic with Palestinians than Israelis, University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, August 7, 2025, https://sadat.umd.edu/sites/sadat.umd.edu/files/August%20Poll%20082525%20FINAL.pdf.
[27] Gallup, “Israelis No Longer Ahead in Americans’ Middle East Sympathies,” February 27, 2026, https://news.gallup.com/poll/702440/israelis-no-longer-ahead-americans-middle-east-sympathies.aspx
[28] Daphne Richemond-Barak, interview by Benjamin Anthony, “Prof. Richemond-Barak on ‘Silent Boycott’ Targeting Jewish, Israeli Academics,” Opinionated with Benjamin Anthony, i24NEWS English, YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJQYkgkr12M.
[29] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4, 1998, pp. 887–917, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789. The U.S. Political Declaration seeks to build international consensus around responsible military AI; the ICRC report emphasizes human control over weapon systems and the use of force; and Finnemore and Sikkink provide the classic account of norm emergence and norm entrepreneurship.
[30] See “Israel Defence Forces’ Response to Claims about Use of ‘Lavender’ AI Database in Gaza,” The Guardian, April 3, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/israel-defence-forces-response-to-claims-about-use-of-lavender-ai-database-in-gaza; Israel Defense Forces, “The IDF’s Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing,” June 18, 2024, https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/june-24-pr/the-idfs-use-of-data-technologies-in-intelligence-processing-published-june-18-2024/. The April response, published by The Guardian alongside its reporting, rejected the characterization of Lavender as an AI system that identifies terrorist operatives or predicts whether a person is a terrorist, describing the relevant tool instead as part of a process for cross-referencing intelligence sources. The later official IDF statement offered a fuller clarification regarding Habsora and Lavender, stating that such tools assist intelligence analysts, do not independently identify or select targets, and cannot serve as the sole basis for target identification. These statements are significant, but they remain reactive clarifications concerning specific systems rather than a broader public doctrine of responsible military AI.
[31] Roy Schöndorf, “Israel’s Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber Operations,” International Law Studies 97, no. 1 (2021): 395–406, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol97/iss1/21/
[32] On existing international efforts to develop principles for responsible military AI, see Responsible AI in the Military Domain, REAIM Blueprint for Action, Seoul Summit, 2024, REAIM-Blueprint-for-Action-비공식번역본.pdf; Responsible AI in the Military Domain, REAIM 2026 Pathways to Action, A Coruña Summit, 2026, https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/REAIM2026/Documents/REAIM%202026%20Pathways%20to%20Action.pdf; “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy,” Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-arms-control-deterrence-and-stability/political-declaration-on-responsible-military-use-of-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomy/. These initiatives address responsible development and use of military AI, human control, accountability, testing, legal compliance, and risk governance. The point here is not that such forums are absent, but that they remain broad and do not fully address the specific diplomatic and governance challenges faced by democracies using AI-enabled systems under conditions of active, ongoing conflict.
[33] For examples of the broader diplomatic, academic, technological, and cultural pressures facing Israel, see Alexander Cornwell, “Israel Says France Bans Its Officials from Weapons Show,” Reuters, June 1, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/israels-defence-ministry-says-france-bans-israeli-officials-defence-show-2026-06-01/; “Israeli Participation in Horizon Europe Halves as Boycotts Bite,” Science|Business, April 16, 2026, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/horizon-europe/israeli-participation-horizon-europe-halves-boycotts-bite; Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, “Boycott Eurovision Until Genocidal Israel Is Banned,” May 15, 2026, https://bdsmovement.net/boycott-eurovision-2026; and Samuel Neaman Institute, The Academic Boycott of Israel: Status Report for June 2025, June 2025, https://www.neaman.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Report_Scholar-Shield-Report-ENG_V4.pdf.
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