Strained, not Broken: Israel-Asia Relations and the October 7 War

Hamas’ attacks and the ensuing war disrupted a positive trajectory in Israel’s relations with the continent. While complicating ties with several countries, cooperation in fields like defence and economy have mostly not been affected. Nevertheless, repairing relations with some partners after the war will require significant diplomatic efforts

Photo by William Navarro on Unsplash

Before the outbreak of war on 7 October 2023, Israel's relations with Asia were on an upward trajectory, particularly following the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020.[1] These agreements transformed Israel from an isolated state in the Middle East to a sought-after regional player, especially in the Arab Gulf. The transition opened new avenues for Israel, not only in the Middle East and North Africa but also in Asia, which is poised to become the world’s new economic and geopolitical centre.

Under the “Look East” policy of the previous Netanyahu governments (2009-2021), Israel advanced relations with key Asian countries through strategic initiatives, including free trade negotiations with China, India, and Vietnam, and the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Korea.[2]Additionally, defence ties were significantly strengthened with nations like the Philippines and Japan, driven by mutual benefits, Asia’s growing global importance, and Israel's advanced defence technology and innovation.

The war, which renewed international focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its regional and global disruptions, and the potential for regional escalations, has had a substantial impact on Israel’s relationships with Asian countries. While Israel’s defence sales to Asia have surged to new highs during the conflict, relations with its leading Asian partners have seen a significant slowdown in diplomatic initiatives, trade, and private-sector cooperation.[3] Concerns over risk and stability, along with criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and its current government’s lack of an expressed strategic vision for a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have damaged Israel’s regional standing and made it a less attractive and riskier partner.

Most of Israel’s Asian partners have maintained a relatively balanced stance regarding the war, with many publicly or privately suggesting that relations will return to normal once it ends. However, some nations, particularly China, have been more openly critical of Israel’s policies on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Others, such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea, have seen a rise in negative public opinion regarding Israel, which has impacted their relationships with the country.

As Asia's influence continues to grow regionally and globally, and Israel faces increasing international isolation, the importance of the country’s relationships with the continent will only become more critical. Israeli decision-makers must adopt a strategic, rather than opportunistic, approach to these partnerships. While the ongoing war in Gaza has complicated ties, it has also underscored the importance of these relationships and their potential for recovery.

The Changing Asia-Middle East Dynamic

Even before current regional instabilities, the Middle East has been undergoing a substantial change. Despite President Biden’s reassurances that the US would not abandon the Middle East, a perceived disengagement – which began during the Obama administration – led to a confidence crisis among US regional allies. This crisis, fueled by US setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, troop withdrawals, domestic challenges, and a growing US focus on Asia, prompted countries in the Middle East to seek new partnerships to fill the emerging power vacuum.

In recent years, the Superpower Competition has also been increasingly felt in the Middle East. As the US pressured China in Asia, Beijing has moved to respond in the Middle East.

Middle Eastern countries, for their part, began exploring new alliances and regional collaborations to secure their security and economic interests. This shift led to the rise of minilateralism: interest-based cooperation among select countries on specific issues.[4] Minilateralism enables countries to form flexible, pragmatic partnerships that address shared concerns without the constraints inherent in joining broader alliances.

For Israel, the combination of the Abraham Accords, reduced tensions with Arab and Muslim countries and emerging openings to engage new partners in the Gulf, together with the regional push towards minilateralism, created new opportunities to join smaller initiatives involving nations from both the Middle East and Asia.[5]

One significant development in geopolitical realignment was the formation of I2U2 – a partnership established in October 2021 by Israel, the UAE, India, and the US.[6] I2U2’s flexible agenda focuses on expanding economic cooperation without the complications of security overtones or geopolitical differences. The partnership aligns with the US’s strategy of countering perceptions of disengagement and increasing Chinese influence. One key initiative is the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was announced at the G20 Summit in Delhi in September 2023.[7]

Asian Powers: China and India

China and India are currently the two most influential Asian powers in the Middle East, and both have a growing regional presence and substantial ties with Israel. As the Superpower Competition intensifies, the two seek to play more active roles in the Middle East through both bilateral and regional initiatives.

China is expanding its influence in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the expansion of BRICS. Meanwhile, India is engaging in initiatives such as the US-led IMEC and I2U2, as well as other trilateral arrangements like India-UAE-France. Their approach to relations with Israel and the current war should be seen through this prism.

China initially reacted to the October 7 attack passively, failing to condemn Hamas by name and calling for restraint on all sides.[8] Gradually, however, its approach became more vocal and more one-sided, marked by increasingly anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric.[9]

China’s calculated shift towards a more assertive and pro-Palestinian stance reflects its evolving priorities in the Middle East and the Global South. Traditionally, Beijing was a status quo player in the Middle East, carefully balancing relationships across regional divides, with a strong preference for stability to advance its economic interests.

However, growing tensions with the United States, alongside the region's growing significance as a theatre for superpower rivalry, appear to have shifted Beijing’s strategic equation. While China does not want to see a regional war, it seems willing to tolerate some instability, particularly if it undermines the United States' position in the region. Israel, ultimately, does not rank highly in Beijing’s strategic calculations, and any damage to their relationship is considered manageable in the broader geopolitical game.

Consequently, Beijing has leveraged the conflict to discredit American influence while bolstering its own. It aims to secure Arab and Muslim support for its policies in Xinjiang, while countering Western criticism of its human rights policies.[10] Beijing’s efforts to mediate between Palestinian factions, including hosting talks with rival groups in April and July 2024, and the signing of the Beijing Declaration,[11] were aimed at carving a more practical role in the conflict and positioning China as a diplomatic player to be reckoned with. But despite China’s PR success, leaders in the Middle East continue to believe that only the US can broker a solution to the conflict.

Israel PM Netanyahu greets India PM Modi in Israel, 2017 | Photo: Haim Tzach, GPO

India has maintained its close relationship with Israel during the war, reflecting a continued strategic tilt under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.[12] Modi was among the first global leaders to express solidarity with Israel following the October 7 Hamas attack.

However, this closer alignment has been carefully managed to avoid alienating key domestic constituencies and partners in the Arab world, given India’s large Muslim population, its substantial economic ties with Gulf states and the presence of millions of Indian workers in the region.[13] While India has voiced support for Israel’s right to defend itself, it has also maintained its traditional support for a two-state solution, demonstrating a nuanced approach to balancing its regional interests.[14]

The ongoing conflict has impacted broader regional initiatives in which India is a key player, among them the IMEC, raising concerns about its feasibility and the long-term implications for India's strategic ambitions in the region.[15] Despite these challenges, India remains committed to its role in the IMEC and other cross-regional groupings, such as I2U2.

US-aligned: Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan

The countries in this group are close US allies and democracies. Their relationship with Israel is heavily influenced by the American position and the stance of other like-minded nations and the potential impact on their engagement with the broader region. Additionally, unhelpful statements by Israeli officials, considerations of international law, and the positions of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecutor and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), along with increasingly negative domestic public opinion, also shape their attitudes towards Israel.

Japan’s relations with Israel have grown significantly in the past five years, particularly in economic and technological cooperation.[16] Japanese investment in Israel reached a record $2.9 billion in 2021, driven partly by the momentum generated by the Abraham Accords. This surge in investment opened new doors for potential trilateral cooperation between Japan, Israel, and the UAE. As global dynamics shift, Japan has been reassessing its regional and global positions, opening new opportunities for cooperation with Israel, including in defence.[17]

The war has introduced new complexities into Japan’s relationship with Israel. While cooperation continues, notably in the technology, innovation, and defence sectors, Japan has taken a more cautious diplomatic stance in response to the war, incurring some criticism within the G7.[18] In addition to an increasingly negative domestic public opinion, concerns have arisen regarding the stability of Japanese investments in Israel and the potential impact of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians on Japan’s broader economic interests in the region.

South Korea’s relationship with Israel has deepened significantly in recent years, particularly following the implementation of a free trade agreement in December 2022.[19] This agreement, Israel’s first in Asia, not only boosted its economy by reducing the prices of Korean products, but also set the stage for agreements with other Asian countries.

Historically, Israel-South Korea relations have centred on security, with substantial defence cooperation dating back to the early 2000s. Bilateral trade between the two nations saw a notable 35% increase in 2021, reflecting the growing importance of their economic partnership.[20]

Seoul condemned the Hamas terrorist attack and expressed support for Israel’s right to defend itself, aligning with its broader policy of supporting international stability and security. However, as the conflict in Gaza intensified, Seoul adopted a more measured stance in line with its commitment to humanitarian concerns, emphasising the need for Israel to exercise restraint and prioritise the protection of civilians.[21]

South Korea’s approach during the war has been shaped by its strategic alliances, particularly with the United States, and its economic ties to the Middle East, which is becoming strategic for Seoul.[22] Reports of the use of North Korean weapons by Hamas and other terrorist groups in the region have also raised concerns in South Korea.[23] 

Australia’s relationship with Israel has long been characterised by strong bipartisan support, with deep economic and defence ties rooted in shared democratic values and strategic interests. However, the ongoing war in Gazahas complicated this relationship, especially under the current Labor government. Following the October 7 attack, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s government unequivocally condemned Hamas’ attack and reaffirmed its support for Israel’s right to defend itself. This stance aligned Australia closely with its traditional allies, including the US and Britain.

However, as the conflict in Gaza escalated and dragged on, criticism of Israel’s military actions began to emerge, particularly within the Labor Party. Some members voiced concerns over the humanitarian impact of Israel’s actions, calling for a more balanced approach that includes stronger advocacy for Palestinian rights and greater pressure on Israel to adhere to international humanitarian law.[24] The conflict has also strained economic ties, with delegations and visits to Israel put on hold and a noticeable cooling in broader economic relations.

Pro-Palestinian protests in New South Wales, November 2023. Canberra cannot ignore domestic public opinion | Photo: Nikolas Gannon on Unsplash

Regionally, Australia has sought to balance its close relationship with Israel and its Southeast Asian neighbours, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which have significant Muslim populations and whose governments are critical of Israel.[25] Despite these challenges and the changing political atmosphere, the foundational aspects of the Australia-Israel relationship remain intact. However, restoring the relationship to the prewar state will require careful diplomatic work.

Taiwan strongly aligned itself with Israel following the October 7 attacks.[26] The war was perceived in Taipei as a unique opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Israel. Taiwan’s consistent backing of Israel, despite domestic pressure, coupled with tangible support through financial assistance for Israeli civil society initiatives during the war, contrasts dramatically with China’s response.[27] On the Israeli side, anger and disappointment with China’s antagonistic position towards Israel have led to a greater openness towards cooperation with Taiwan, including official visits this year by two parliamentary delegations to Taipei.[28] 

Facing increased pressure from China, Taiwan viewed its public condemnation of Hamas and visible solidarity with Israel as an opportunity not only to garner greater support and deepen cooperation with an increasingly isolated Israel, but also to bolster Taipei’s alignment with democratic allies, particularly the United States, in other international arenas.[29]

Southeast Asia: Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines

Israel’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries have evolved significantly over the years, driven by shared interests in defence, technology, and economic cooperation. Despite the complexities introduced by the war, Israel has managed to maintain and even strengthen its ties with smaller partners from the region. These are characterised by a delicate balance of strategic interests, economic partnerships, and diplomatic considerations, particularly as these nations navigate their roles in the broader geopolitical landscape.

Singapore and Israel share a long history of cooperation, particularly in defence, technology, and economic sectors. The arrival of Singapore’s first resident Ambassador to Israel, Ian Mak, in late 2023 marked a significant milestone in the bilateral relationship, underscoring Singapore’s commitment to deepening ties with Israel despite the ongoing conflict.[30] 

Singapore condemned the October 7 attack, supporting Israel’s right to defend itself while also calling for restraint and the protection of civilians. This response reflects Singapore’s broader policy of maintaining strong security ties while advocating for peace and stability through international law and multilateralism.

Singapore has traditionally maintained a discreet yet robust defence relationship with Israel, focusing on military training, cybersecurity, and defence technology.[31] The ongoing conflict has not significantly impacted these ties, as both countries recognise the strategic importance of their partnership.

However, the war has led some in Singapore to call for a more nuanced approach to its relationship with Israel, particularly given the sensitivities of its multicultural society and significant Muslim population.[32] The government has had to carefully manage these domestic concerns while maintaining its foreign policy objectives.[33] Singapore’s response to the Gaza war also aligns with its broader regional strategy within ASEAN, where it must navigate its relationships with other members who support the Palestinian cause while preserving its strategic partnership with Israel.

Vietnam and Israel have developed a strong partnership over the years, characterised by agriculture, technology, and defence cooperation. Despite the war, this partnership remains solid, with Israel playing a crucial role in helping Vietnam modernise key sectors of its economy, such as agriculture and water management. Israel and Vietnam signed an FTA in July 2023, but the war has postponed ratification. Defence cooperation has increased, particularly in air defence systems and cybersecurity. However, the conflict has prompted Vietnam to carefully balance its non-aligned foreign policy with its economic and strategic interests.

Following the October 7 attack, Vietnam expressed concern over the violence but refrained from taking a strong stance, consistent with its longstanding policy of non-interference.[34] Vietnam called for restraint by all parties and emphasised the need for a peaceful resolution through dialogue and international law.[35] While Vietnam remains committed to its cooperation with Israel, it is cautious to ensure that these ties do not adversely affect its relationships with other regional countries, particularly in the Arab world.

The Philippines has close ties with Israel, grounded in shared security interests, economic cooperation, and a significant Filipino expatriate community in Israel. The bilateral relationship has been solid in defence, with Israel providing the Philippines with advanced military equipment and training. This cooperation has continued despite the conflict, underscoring the strategic importance both countries place on their defence ties.

The Philippines condemned the October 7 attack and affirmed its support for Israel’s right to defend itself. As the war escalated, Manila also expressed concern for the humanitarian situation in Gaza, calling for the protection of civilians and Israeli adherence to international humanitarian law.

Moreover, the war has prompted some within the Philippines to call for a reassessment of its close ties with Israel, particularly considering the conflict’s humanitarian impact.[36] Civil society groups and some political figures have urged the government to adopt a more balanced stance, emphasising the need for a peaceful resolution and greater attention to Palestinians’ rights.[37] Despite these concerns, the relationship between the Philippines and Israel is expected to remain resilient, with continued collaboration on security and technological fronts.

Conclusion: Looking forward

As Asia’s importance on the regional and global stage increases, and Israel faces the risk of international isolation, the significance of Israel-Asia relations will only deepen.

Israel’s relations with China have grown more complex this past year, especially as Beijing seeks a potentially more active role in the conflict, particularly on the Arab side. Despite disappointment with China’s stance towards Israel, Israeli decision-makers must recognise that China’s regional presence and influence are set to expand.

Israel will likely encounter China more frequently in regional capitals like Abu Dhabi and Riyadh than in Tel Aviv. To navigate this evolving dynamic, it should shift from a purely bilateral focus and reactive approach to a broader, more calculated regional and geopolitical strategy when managing its relationship with Beijing.  

Israel should regularly concentrate its efforts on assessing the impact of China’s policies and actions on the region and Israel’s interests. Meticulous analyses can inform a strategic approach that considers superpower competition, China’s influence, and relations with other Asian powers. Engaging in strategic discussions with Gulf and regional partners on these issues—including Egypt, the UAE, and eventually Saudi Arabia—will be crucial.

Israel should cooperate with regional partners to develop joint strategies or positions, particularly on issues related to connectivity, infrastructure, and technology. Such proactive engagement will help align regional interests and enhance cooperative efforts.

Regarding the current conflict, rather than outright rejecting Beijing’s involvement, Israeli decision-makers could indicate a potential openness for China to play a role in a relevant regional project – if Beijing signals a return towards a more balanced position. By adopting this approach, Israel can potentially channel Beijing’s claimed “active engagement” in a direction that aligns with its own interests and objectives. This would also provide China an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment through tangible action. Such a project could be developed in collaboration with a regional partner, such as the UAE, ensuring that it meets both Israel’s interests, as well as broader regional goals.

Overcoming political differences with close US allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea may take time, though low-key defence and technology cooperation is likely to continue once the fighting subsides. However, Israel should not settle for continuing these “discreet” arrangements and must consider that once they become institutionalised, it can be challenging to shift towards a more open and strategic cooperation, one which can bolster Israel’s status and influence. In contrast, Israel’s Southeast Asian partners can be expected to resume full cooperation more quickly, and it should allocate resources and attention to strengthening these relationships.

While much focus has been on China’s growing role in the Middle East and its ties with Tehran, it is crucial to remember that India, Japan, and South Korea also maintain strong trade relationships in the Arab Gulf, including with Iran. Given the region's shifting dynamics and rising tensions, Israel’s relationships with these countries become even more important.

For meaningful progress, the current war must first come to an end. A year after the October 7 attacks, it is increasingly evident that a US-led regional solution offers the most viable path forward. Advancing this approach could be crucial not only for Israel's reintegration into the Middle East, but also for reshaping its engagement with Asia.

Rather than hinder them, Israel should actively support and encourage US efforts to reestablish a regional framework . This approach should involve moving towards normalising relations with Saudi Arabia and laying the groundwork for a future two-state solution, even on a declarative level. Such a plan could integrate elements of the Arab Peace Initiative and potentially involve other global powers, including those from Asia.

Despite the setbacks and challenges posed by the conflict, the Abraham Accords, along with US-led initiatives like I2U2 and IMEC, remain strategically relevant and offer significant opportunities for Israel to bolster its ties with Asia and elevate its international status. These frameworks can play a crucial role in strengthening Israel's position within the Middle East, supporting Washington’s strategic cross-regional vision, and cementing Israel’s strategic relationship with India. A return to the regional connectivity framework could see Japan and South Korea join, alongside other regional partners.

An end to the war, followed by the expansion of the Abraham Accords and the establishment of a regional framework for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian issue – one which incorporates Israel’s new Asian partners – could be key to restoring Israel’s bilateral relations with its Asian partners and creating a solid diplomatic foundation for future regional engagement. 

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Dr. Gedaliah Afterman is head of the Israel-Asia Policy Program at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations at Reichman University.

Notes:

[1] Gedaliah Afterman and Theresa Hoffmann, “Two Years after the Abraham Accords,” Insight 296, Middle East Institute, 22 May 2023. https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/insight-296-two-years-after-the-abraham-accords/

[2] Yuval Ben-David and Michael Martina, “As part of Asia pivot, Netanyahu pushes Israeli hi-tech in China,” Reuters, 20 March 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-china-business/as-part-of-asia-pivot-netanyahu-pushes-israeli-hi-tech-in-china-idUSKBN16R1AV/; Government of Israel - Foreign Ministry, Free Trade Agreement Between The Government Of The State Of Israel And The Government Of The Republic Of Korea, 12 May 2021.  https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/policy/israel-south-korea-fta/he/sahar-hutz_agreements_fta-korea-il-en.pdf

[3] Emanuel Fabian, “Israeli arms sales break record for 3rd year in row, reaching $13 billion in 2023,” Times of Israel, 17 June 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-arms-sales-break-record-for-3rd-year-in-row-reaching-13-billion-in-2023/ 

[4] Jean-Loup Samaan, “The Minilateral Moment In The Middle East: An Opportunity For US Regional Policy?”,  Atlantic Council, 5 July 2023. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-minilateral-moment-in-the-middle-east-an-opportunity-for-us-regional-policy/

[5] Gedaliah Afterman and N. Janardhan, "The Abraham Accords Bring the Middle East And Asia Closer," Arena Journal, 14 September 2022. https://www.eng.arenajournal.org.il/single-post/issue12-afterman-janardhan-middle-east-asia-eng

[6] Gedaliah Afterman et al., "Minilateralism And I2U2: Refining Realpolitik," Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, 25 September 2023. https://www.agda.ac.ae/research/publications-multimedia-events/publication-details/minilateralism-and-i2u2

[7] Navdeep Suri et al., "India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: Towards a New Discourse in Global Connectivity," Observer Research Foundation, 9 April 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-towards-a-new-discourse-in-global-connectivity

[8] Laura Zhou, "China calls for 'calm and restraint' as Israel declares war after deadly Hamas raid," South China Morning Post, 8 October 2023. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3237203/china-calls-calm-and-restraint-israel-declares-war-after-deadly-hamas-raid

[9] Grant Rumley and Rachel Redlich, "Tracking Chinese Statements On The Hamas-Israel Conflict," The Washington Institute, 1 August 2024. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-chinese-statements-hamas-israel-conflict

[10] Gedaliah Afterman and Tomer Raanan, "From Gaza To Xinjiang, Israel Is Increasingly In China's Crossfire," Nikkei Asia, 5 July 2021. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/From-Gaza-to-Xinjiang-Israel-is-increasingly-in-China-s-crossfire

[11] Jesse Marks, "Palestinian Factions Meet In China, Sign 'Beijing Declaration' (translated Version Included)," Substack, 23 July 2024. https://jessemarks.substack.com/p/palestinian-factions-meet-in-china

[12] Daniel Markey, "Amid War In The Middle East, India-Israel Ties Reach New Milestone," United States Institute Of Peace, 7 November 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/amid-war-middle-east-india-israel-ties-reach-new-milestone

[13] Md Muddassir Qumar, "India And The Crises In The Middle East: Treading A Complex Tightrope," Institute For Security And Development Policy, 28 February 2024. https://www.isdp.eu/india-and-the-crises-in-the-middle-east-treading-a-complex-tightrope/

[14] "Gaza Conflict: Only Two-state Solution Between Both Sides Will Deliver Enduring Peace, Says India," DD News, 5 March 2024. https://ddnews.gov.in/en/gaza-conflict-only-two-state-solution-between-both-sides-will-deliver-enduring-peace-says-india/

[15] Adam Lucente, "Gaza War Complicates IMEC Plans Even As Gulf-India Ties Warm," Al-Monitor, 25 May 2024. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/05/gaza-war-complicates-imec-plans-even-gulf-india-ties-warm

[16] Satoshi Ikeuchi and Gedaliah Afterman, "The Time Has Come For A Japan-Israel Strategic Partnership," Arena Journal, 14 March 2022. https://www.eng.arenajournal.org.il/single-post/ieuchi-afterman-japan-israel-relations-eng

[17] Government of Israel - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "DM Gantz signs Defense Cooperation Memorandum with Japan," 30 August 2022. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/dm-gantz-signs-defense-cooperation-memorandum-with-japan-30-aug-2022

[18] Herb Keinon, "Japan's Rocky Road And Balancing Act With Israel During Hamas War," The Jerusalem Post, 10 February 2024. https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-785955; Lili Hülsemann, "Nagasaki Memorial Ceremony Becomes Center Stage Of Geopolitics," Politico, 9 August 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/nagasaki-memorial-ceremony-centre-stage-geopolitics-israel/

[19] Government of Israel - Foreign Ministry, "Free Trade Agreement Between The Government Of The State Of Israel And The Government Of The Republic Of Korea."

[20] "Israel-South Korea free trade deal to take effect Dec. 1," Reuters, 28 September 2022. https://www.reuters.com/markets/israel-south-korea-free-trade-deal-take-effect-dec-1-2022-09-28/

[21] Kaylee Orta, "Where Does South Korea Stand On The Israel-Hamas Conflict?" The Diplomat, 19 October 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/where-does-south-korea-stand-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict/

[22] Orta, "Where Does South Korea Stand?"; Nam Hyun-Woo, "Korea, UAE Sign Free Trade Pact At Yoon-Mohamed Summit," The Korea Times, 29 May 2024. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/08/113_375592.html

[23] Sohee Kang, "South Korea Confirms Hamas Used North Korean Weapons in War," Bloomberg, 8 January 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-08/south-korea-confirms-hamas-used-north-korean-weapons-in-war?embedded-checkout=true

[24] Tiffanie Turnbull, "Israel Gaza: Australia Hints It Could Recognise Palestinian State," BBC News, 10 April 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-68758678; "Australia says Israel must change course in Gaza to keep international support," The Times of Israel, 12 March 2024. https://www.timesofisrael.com/australia-says-israel-must-change-course-in-gaza-to-keep-international-support/

[25] Banyan, "In South-East Asia, The War In Gaza Is Roiling Emotions," The Economist, 9 May 2024. https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/05/09/in-south-east-asia-the-war-in-gaza-is-roiling-emotions

[26] Tuvia Gering, "Why Taiwan Stands With Israel," Atlantic Council, 25 April 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-taiwan-stands-with-israel/

[27] Anna Mahjar-Barducci, "Israel's Friend In The East: Taiwan Has Stepped Up Since October 7," Ynetnews, 27 June 2024. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/byr3znjuc

[28] Jordyn Haime, "As Relations With Beijing Cool, Israel Seeks Closer Bilateral Ties With Taiwan," South China Morning Post, 23 April 2024. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3259932/mideast-conflict-israeli-delegation-visits-taiwan-show-commitment-ties-war-continues-home

[29] Gering, “Why Taiwan Stands With Israel.”

[30] Greer Fay Cashman, "Singapore Sends First Resident Ambassador To Israel Amid Gaza War," The Jerusalem Post, 19 December 2023. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-778685

[31] Ami Rojkes Dombe, "Singapore Buys Iron Dome Radar," Israel Defense, 21 April 2016. https://www.israeldefense.co.il/index.php/en/node/25609

[32] Tessa Oh Zalizan, "Israel's Military Response Has Gone 'Too Far'; Singapore To Donate Third Tranche Of Aid To Gaza: Balakrishnan," TODAY, 29 February 2024. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/israels-military-response-has-gone-too-far-singapore-donate-third-tranche-aid-gaza-balakrishnan-2372786?cid=internal_inarticlelinks_web_08092024_tdy

[33] Kimberly Lim, "Israel-Gaza war: rare protest in Singapore against Israel arms deal spotlights simmering views on conflict," South China Morning Post, 16 April 2024. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3259226/israel-gaza-war-singapore-investigates-latest-anti-israel-protest-there-paradigm-shift-domestic

[34] "Việt Nam 'profoundly concerned' over Hamas-Israel violence: foreign ministry," Viet Nam News, 8 October 2023. https://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/1594905/viet-nam-profoundly-concerned-over-hamas-israel-violence-foreign-ministry.html

[35] "Vietnam Calls for Immediate End To Gaza Violence," Vietnam Mission Geneva - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, 24 July 2024. https://vnmission-geneva.mofa.gov.vn/en-us/News/EmbassyNews/Pages/Vietnam-calls-for-immediate-end-to-Gaza-violence.aspx

[36] Raissa Robles, "Muslim and Christian Filipinos' Divide Over Gaza Down To More Than Just Faith," South China Morning Post, 11 January 2024. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3247982/christian-majority-philippines-religion-not-only-factor-splitting-views-over-israel-gaza-war

[37] John Rachman, "Gaza Is A Burning Topic For Southeast Asia's Domestic Politics," Foreign Policy, 29 December 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/29/gaza-israel-hamas-war-southeast-asia/