From Battlefield Gains to Diplomatic Isolation: Israel in a Shifting Regional and International Order
- Gedaliah Afterman
- Sep 28
- 16 min read
Since dealing a significant blow to Iran in their brief war in June, Israel’s international standing has plummeted sharply as it suffers from international condemnation and growing isolation over its prolonged war in Gaza. Senior sources in the region argue that to reverse this trajectory, Israel must shift from reliance on military force and seize the diplomatic initiative. The first, crucial step is to work with allies and partners to end the war in Gaza
The long list of Western countries expressing their willingness to recognize a Palestinian state at the annual UN summit in September 2025 marked a new low in Israel’s diplomatic standing. After receiving widespread international support following Hamas’s heinous attacks on Israel on October 7th, 2023, Israel’s conduct of the war has slowly alienated allies and partners and deepened its isolation.
Yet only three months ago, things looked decidedly different at the aftermath of the Israel-Iran war of June 2025. With extensive American assistance (and, quietly, also from other actors), Israel delivered a substantial blow to Iran, which did not receive similar support from its allies, Russia and China.
The war was a strategic shock to the Middle East and to the superpowers involved in the region, forcing them to demonstrate their actual commitment and willingness to investment resources. In this sense, President Trump’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure marked a decisive moment not just for Iran and Israel, but for regional and global observers weighing American willpower and influence. Beijing, Moscow, and Arab Gulf capitals all took notice.
Conversations with high-level sources in the region paint a bleak picture: Israel's partners are growing increasingly wary of its current trajectory
However, the war’s aftermath is proving even more decisive. Despite its achievements on the battlefield, nowadays Israel is facing growing diplomatic isolation: the aforementioned recognition of a Palestinian state by leading Western countries who criticize its conduct of the nearly two-year-long war in Gaza; and new red lines drawn by Israel’s closest regional partners over the Netanyahu government’s declared intentions to annex parts of the West Bank.
Those same countries, alarmed by Israel’s growing propensity for the use of force in the region, are now pressuring Washington DC to force an end to the war in Gaza, while publicly warning that plans to annex the West Bank are putting the Abraham Accords at risk. There are signs that the Trump administration is listening.
The tumultuous three months following the ceasefire with Iran demonstrate that with geopolitical and regional shifts creating a more multipolar dynamic, Israel cannot continue to rely on military force alone for its security. It must pair hard power with diplomatic foresight: reinforcing US ties, engaging China cautiously, reaffirming relations with its neighbours, and accelerating regional cooperation through pragmatic collaborative platforms like the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) and the Abraham Accords, which are increasingly under strain.
The test for Israel is no longer military resolve alone, but its ability to adapt to a shifting international order where superpower rivalry and regional pressures converge. Rather than a contributor to regional security, Israel is now increasingly seen as a disruptor.
Multiple conversations with high-level sources in the region paint a bleak picture of regional partners growing increasingly wary of Israel’s current trajectory. According to these sources, to once again become a contributor to regional and international security, peace, and stability, Israel must begin by proactively advancing an internationally-backed solution to end the war in Gaza, eradicate settler violence in the West Bank, nix plans to annex the territory, and reengage constructively with its regional partners.
US Reengagement – With Strings Attached
The Israel-Iran war began on the night of 12 June 2025, with Israel’s strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities and air-defence systems, followed by 12 days of intense exchange of fire. The United States quickly stepped in diplomatically and militarily, culminating in a ceasefire between the warring parties announced by Washington on June 24th.
For Israel, US involvement in the conflict was reassuring but also revealing. It underscored Washington’s enduring centrality to regional security, even as it continues to retrench in other theatres, such as the Indo-Pacific, eastern Europe and the Gulf of Aden.
Yet the nature of that support also played into existing questions regarding America’s predictability and long-term reliability. On June 25th, a mere day after the ceasefire was announced, President Donald Trump’s posted on Truth Social that “China can now continue to purchase oil from Iran. Hopefully, they will be purchasing plenty from the U.S., also” – hinting at a new blend of strategic messaging, economic ambition, and personal bravado.[1]
Under Trump 2.0, American engagement in the Middle East is transactional and unpredictable
Furthermore, while the war with Iran reaffirmed Israel’s military resolve and current technological superiority over its regional rivals (which stands in stark contrast with its gruelling two-year campaign in Gaza), it simultaneously emphasized the growing strategic value of diplomatic leverage and highlighted the necessity of multilateral coordination.[2]
Jerusalem was forced to rely on US support to continue its military campaign but also needed American diplomacy to prevent escalation. At the same time, Washington’s ambivalence – particularly its past failure to respond to attacks on US partners in the Gulf[3] and its negotiations and agreements with the Houthis in Yemen[4] – reminded Israeli leaders that even close allies may pursue competing priorities.
Under Trump 2.0, American engagement in the Middle East is transactional and unpredictable, deeply tied to broader, sometimes eclectic, economic, technological, and geopolitical goals. The US’s growing focus on the Indo-Pacific theatre and assessments that direct conflict with China might take place by 2027, mean that other regions, such as the Middle East and Europe, must make contingency plans for the day when America is largely preoccupied elsewhere.[5]
The revival of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” on Iran coexists with its ongoing interest in Saudi-Israeli normalisation and expanding the Abraham Accords, as well as ambitious infrastructure initiatives such as IMEC. But these are hampered by the ongoing war in Gaza, and none of them come with guaranteed follow-through, which leaves Israel and others hedging.
Israel’s Growing International Isolation
In the months since the June 24th ceasefire, the military and diplomatic gains Israel achieved in its war with Iran[6] have gradually been eroded. Its ongoing war in Gaza, apparent refusal to advance an agreement to end the conflict, and declared plans to annex the West Bank, have drawn widespread criticism and led to growing isolation in Europe; and its frequent use of military force, in Gaza as well as in Iran, Syria, Qatar, Lebanon, and Yemen, have arguably reinforced perceptions of Israel as “more of a Goliath than a David” – further eroding international sympathy and complicating its diplomatic standing in the region.[7]
The Qatar strike particularly was a watershed moment: On September 9th, Israel launched several missiles at a meeting of senior Hamas officials in Doha.[8] The failed attempt to assassinate Hamas’ international leadership caused significant alarm in the Gulf – not only due to Israel’s growing belligerence, but also because it raised questions about Washington’s security guarantees to its allies in the region.[9] The strikes drew condemnations from virtually all regional capitals, including those holding long-standing rivalries with Doha, such as the Abu-Dhabi and Riyadh. Israel has also faced significant international backlash to its military campaign to seize Gaza City, launched in mid-September.[10]
The backlash to Israel’s actions has been concerted pressure by regional actors against Israel in the US, Europe, and international organizations
At the UN annual summit last week, Arab and Muslim leaders – both from partner and hostile states – widely condemned Israel’s actions in the Middle East. The Egyptian foreign minister, alongside other representatives, decried the “genocide” taking place in Gaza; the Saudi Saudi foreign minister lamented “the suffering of the Palestinian people and the unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Gaza”; Oman’s foreign minister called for the UN to sanction Israel; and Qatar’s leader claimed that the September 9th strike in Doha is proof that Israel has become a “rogue” state.[11]
The cumulative backlash to Israel’s actions has been concerted pressure by regional actors against Israel in the US, Europe, and international organizations. Gulf states aligned with the US are now increasingly leaning into the American president regarding the war in Gaza and Israel’s stated plans to annex the West Bank in response to growing international recognition of a Palestinian state.
In early September, several days before the Doha strike, a senior UAE official publicly deemed annexation a “red line” which would endanger Israel’s regional integration.[12] In private conversations, senior Emirati officials have stressed that Israel “should not test” the UAE’s resolve, or mistaken its statements as an attempt to exert political pressure; the country’s ruler, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (commonly referred to as MBZ), will undoubtedly act on his words, they stated.
Later in September, after lobbying by Gulf and Arab state leaders who met with him at the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly, President Trump formally declared that he “will not permit” Israel to annex the West Bank, and later unveiled a new Gaza initiative.[13]
Thus, Israel’s refusal to advance any type of diplomatic initiative to end the war has left it vulnerable to mounting international criticism, and increasingly without favorable options.
Gulf States Moving to Plan B?
The Gulf states, economically and strategically ambitious and security-conscious, must navigate both the rapidly evolving regional landscape and the growing superpower divide. They are not only hedging but also increasingly using their leverage with the superpowers to set the terms of engagement: signalling limits to Israeli actions, deepening ties with China, weighing in on US proposals for Gaza and evaluating Washington’s long-term commitment to the region.
The war with Iran, as well as Israel’s attack on Hamas headquarters in Qatar, only strengthened a trend already underway: regional actors are shifting to their own “Plan B” strategies. Gulf states no longer assume that Washington’s security guarantees can be fully trusted.[14] The June conflict, followed by US ambiguity and Trump’s transactional signalling, confirmed for many that they need to build independent hedges. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are investing in deeper ties with China[15] and pursuing flexible energy and security alignments, even as they remain reliant on American defence guarantees.
The outcome is a more multipolar regional order in which Israel’s ability to shape the rules depends less on battlefield dominance and more on whether it can position itself inside these new economic and diplomatic frameworks. As the war in Gaza continues, and prominent voices within the Israeli government are calling for the annexation of the West Bank, tensions between Israel and its most important regional partner have reached a new high.[16]
The Gulf states remain open to cooperation with Israel, particularly in energy, water, and emerging technologies. However, Israel’s increasing propensity for using force, coupled with a lack of a political horizon in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, remain major obstacles towards deepening ties.[17] The Gulf, as it stands, is not neutral nor passive; it is calculating, and it is moving to set limits.
China’s Calculated Detachment
While Washington intervened dramatically in the Israel-Iran war, China largely stayed on the sidelines. Beijing issued calls for restraint but took no significant steps. This inaction was not surprising, but it was telling. China’s posture may have been calculated to preserve its flexibility when dealing with both sides, but it also reveals a deeper reluctance to be drawn into high-stakes regional security dynamics.
Beijing has long sought to position itself as a partner to all and adversary to none in the Middle East. It trades heavily with the Gulf, supports reconstruction efforts in Syria and Iraq, and remains Iran’s most important economic partner. But its political role remains cautious and calculated.[18]
China's mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 was widely praised by both sides.[19] It has also hosted intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks in Beijing in an attempt to position itself as a regional mediator. But beyond the optics of mediation, China is unlikely to put itself forward for a substantial diplomatic and/or security role, especially one that entails taking risks.
President Trump’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities has likely disrupted Beijing’s regional calculus
It was clearly alarmed by the risk to energy security, particularly the possibility of Tehran blocking the Strait of Hormuz.[20] Iran is economically dependent on China, which imports approximately 90 percent of the Islamic Republic’s oil exports; nevertheless, Beijing’s political leverage over Tehran and its ability to influence its actions seem limited. And even if China could exert pressure, it is unlikely to do so at Washington’s request, unless this was part of a broader move within the context of China-US relations.
President Trump’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities has likely disrupted Beijing’s regional calculus. Beijing’s reluctance to act during the war should indicate to Israel not to overestimate Chinese influence in moments of crisis. Meanwhile, the US show of force may also compel China to reassess American resolve, not only in the Middle East but also in the Indo-Pacific, including over Taiwan.
Following the US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Iran on June 24th, the immediate threat to global energy supplies subsided.[21] But Beijing is recalibrating, reassessing its strategic relationship with Tehran and seeking to reposition itself in a region where US and Israeli military influence has been reasserted, and where President Trump is sending mixed signals between renewed confrontation and diplomatic re-engagement.[22]
China proclaims it can play a constructive role in the Middle East.[23] Yet, Beijing has so far shown little appetite for making the hard choices regional leadership demands. For Israel, increasingly dependent on the United States, managing Chinese regional initiatives would require careful calculation.
A New Strategic Horizon for Israel
Two years since the October 7th massacre and beginning of the war, the mounting diplomatic setbacks it has suffered in the past few weeks illustrate what Israel’s security and diplomatic establishment increasingly realize: military force alone is no longer enough to advance Israel’s foreign policy goals. The challenge, as always, is to translate military gains into political outcomes with a strategic vision for a more secure region, through a mix of regional coalition-building, diplomacy, and economic strategy.
Israel cannot risk eroding its peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, nor damage the Abraham Accords it signed with additional Arab and Muslim states. Similarly, more recent initiatives such as IMEC are not just trade or infrastructure projects, but vehicles to reshape Israel’s strategic environment and secure its place in the region. Israel cannot afford to neglect these hard-earned strategic gains for questionable short-term military gains in Gaza.
In the current dynamic environment, Israel must think beyond wielding military capabilities that are effective in the immediate and short-term
In the current dynamic environment, Israel must think beyond wielding military capabilities that are effective in the immediate and short-term. Instead, it must simultaneously strengthen and rebuild its long-term diplomatic positioning in the region and beyond and multilateral engagement to “cash in” its military achievements. That means:
Reinforcing its alliance with the US, while simultaneously bolstering preparations and contingency plans for a potential flux in the relationship. Trump’s support may be strong now, but the current vector of US policy, including towards Israel, is no longer guaranteed.[24] As it nears its third year, support for Israel’s war in Gaza is dipping among both Democrats, Republicans, and independent voters.[25]
China’s limited role in the war with Iran should not be read as strategic irrelevance. Its influence in the Middle East rests on geoeconomic and technological tools rather than military power, offering a different model to that of the United States. For Israel, the task is to engage China constructively but cautiously – not as an alternative to Washington but as a major economic partner and technological innovator with a growing regional presence. China is likely to deepen its role as an economic and technological partner, including with Israel’s closest regional counterparts.
Israel must therefore balance two imperatives: safeguard its innovation and infrastructure sectors, while remaining sensitive to US concerns. Failure to do so, as past experiences show, risks creating avoidable friction with both Washington and Beijing.[26]
Pursuing regional cooperation that is substantial, not just symbolic. That includes continuing to advance the IMEC initiative introduced by President Biden and later endorsed by President Trump, supporting pragmatic normalisation steps with Gulf states, and investing in shared economic and environmental interests.[27]
Conclusion
The Middle East remains a region shaped by global powers’ interests, but increasingly, it is also informing their policies. Israel’s war with Iran, and the international responses it triggered, underscored the enduring centrality of the United States, the cautious ambitions of China, and the growing agency of regional players. The UN Security Council’s decision to “snap back” sanctions on Iran, taken on 26 September 2025, will also have strategic consequences for the region, though it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore.[28]
For Israel, this is both a moment of risk of further marginalisation and a strategic opportunity to pivot from perpetual conflict to regional integration. However, its current course is taking it in the opposite direction. The war in Gaza and policies towards the West Bank, alongside its propensity for a military approach, are not only blocking progress under the Abraham Accords but are beginning to unravel their very foundations. Israel’s current leadership risks forfeiting the chance to anchor itself in the emerging regional architecture and might soon find the door to cooperation closing for years to come.
Military power still matters in the unstable Middle East, but from Washington to Riyadh and from Delhi and Beijing to Abu Dhabi, the toolbox for shaping the region’s future is increasingly shifting to geoeconomics. To seize that opportunity, Israel must act with urgency. It needs to end the war in Gaza in a way that restores credibility, rebuilds trust with key partners, and opens space for broader engagement. One way to take the initiative would be to start discussions with the region, including with Saudi Arabia, on the basis of a revised Arab Peace Initiative. This will allow Israel to take the initiative, create regional momentum and ensure its security interests are secured.
Israel must reinforce its alliance with Washington while preparing for a less predictable American role. It should engage China pragmatically on trade and technology while safeguarding its strategic sectors and avoiding friction with the US And it must invest in real regional cooperation through the Abraham Accords, IMEC, and shared projects in energy, water, and climate resilience, not as symbolic gestures but as platforms for durable interdependence.
The choice before Israel is stark: continue down a path of short-term wars that erode its international standing and risk growing isolation, or take bold steps to anchor itself as a constructive, strategic force in the emerging regional order. In a Middle East where superpower dynamics are evolving, Israel’s strategy must do so, too.
Dr. Gedaliah Afterman is head of the Israel-Asia Policy Program at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations at Reichman University.
Notes
[1] Timothy Gardner, “Trump says China can buy Iranian oil, but urges it to purchase US crude,” Reuters, 25 June 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/trump-says-china-can-continue-purchase-oil-iran-2025-06-24/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-israel-nuclear-program-693a4e2a
[2] Bilal Y. Saab and Darren D. White, “Lessons Observed from the War Between Israel and Iran,” War on the Rocks, 16 July 2025. https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/lessons-observed-from-the-war-between-israel-and-iran/
[3] See for example the attacks on ARAMCO facilities in Saudi Arabia in 2019, allegedly executed by Iran, and the Houthi’s strike on Abu Dhabi in 2022. Natasha Turak, “Detailed satellite photos show extent of ‘surgical’ attack damage to Saudi Aramco oil facilities,” CNBC, 17 September 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/17/satellite-photos-show-extent-of-damage-to-saudi-aramco-plants.html; Ghaida Ghantous and Alexander Cornwell, “U.S. condemns deadly Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi; UAE reserves right to respond,” 18 January 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-says-suspects-drones-behind-abu-dhabi-fires-yemens-houthis-claim-attack-2022-01-17/
[4] Tomer Raanan, “Bombarded Ras Isa port resumes operations as security and sanction threats linger,” Analysis, Lloyd’s List, 16 May 2025. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1153494/Bombarded-Ras-Isa-port-resumes-operations-as-security-and-sanction-threats-linger
[5] Ronny Reyes, “NATO chief predicts how China could set off World War III: ‘Let’s not be naive about this’”, New York Post, 6 July 2025. https://nypost.com/2025/07/06/world-news/nato-chief-predicts-how-china-could-set-off-world-war-iii-lets-not-be-naive-about-this/; Scott Lee et al., “For NATO in 2027, European leadership will be key to deterrence against Russia,” Issue Brief, The Atlantic Council, 2 July 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/for-nato-in-2027-european-leadership-will-be-key-to-deterrence-against-russia/
[6] Richard Connor, Timothy Jones and Kate Hairsine, “Germany's Merz says Israel doing 'dirty work for us' in Iran,” DW.com, 17 June 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-merz-says-israel-doing-dirty-work-for-us-in-iran/live-72939104; Patrick Wintour, “Macron lays out broad European offer for Iran to end war with Israel,” The Guardian, 20 June 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/20/macron-lays-out-broad-offer-for-iran-to-end-war-with-israel; Patrick Wintour, “David Lammy refuses to say if UK supported US strikes on Iran nuclear facilities,” The Guardian, 23 June 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jun/23/uk-david-lammy-us-strikes-iran-nuclear-facilities-legality
[7] Mohammed Baharoon and Alex Vatanka, “Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath,” Analysis, Middle East Institute, 12 August 2025. https://www.mei.edu/publications/gulf-arabs-fear-israel-becoming-goliath ; Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, “Are Arab nations going to impose real costs on Israel?” New Atlantacist, The Atlantic Council, 18 September 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/are-arab-nations-going-to-impose-real-costs-on-israel/
[8] Helen Regan, “Israel strikes Hamas leadership in Qatar in unprecedented attack. Here’s what to know,” CNN, 10 September 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/10/middleeast/israel-strikes-hamas-qatar-explainer-intl-hnk
[9] Giorgio Cofiero, “How Israel’s strike on Doha is forcing a Gulf security reckoning,” MENA Source, The Atlantic Council, 19 September 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-israels-strike-on-doha-is-forcing-a-gulf-security-reckoning/
[10] Tom Bennet, “Israel launches ground offensive on Gaza City,” BBC, 16 September 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c749q1245pwo
[11] TOI Staff, “Arab leaders decry Gaza ‘genocide,’ urge Palestinian state in impassioned UN speeches,” Times of Israel, 27 September 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/arab-leaders-decry-gaza-genocide-urge-palestinian-state-in-impassioned-un-speeches/ ; Caolán Magee, “Qatar’s emir accuses Israel of trying to derail Gaza truce talks,” Al-Jazeera, 23 September 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/23/qatars-emir-accuses-israel-of-trying-to-derail-gaza-truce-talks
[12] Jacob Magid, “UAE warns Israel: Annexing West Bank is a ‘red line’ that would ‘end regional integration’,” The Times of Israel, 4 September 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/uae-warns-israel-annexing-west-bank-a-red-line-that-would-end-regional-integration/ ; Alexander Cornwell, “Exclusive: UAE could downgrade diplomatic ties if Israel annexes West Bank, sources say,” Reuters, 18 September 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/uae-could-downgrade-diplomatic-ties-if-israel-annexes-west-bank-sources-say-2025-09-18/
[13] Will Weissert, “Trump says he will not allow Israel to annex the West Bank,” AP News, 26 September 2025. https://apnews.com/article/trump-israel-gaza-annex-west-bank-284f2db5b5e549cfecb6b24b26d98460; Jacob Magid, “Revealed: US 21-point plan for ending Gaza war, creating pathway to Palestinian state,” The Times of Israel, 27 September 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/revealed-us-21-point-plan-for-ending-gaza-war-creating-pathway-to-palestinian-state/
[14] Cofiero, “How Israel’s strike on Doha is forcing a Gulf security reckoning”; Baharoon and Vatanka, “Gulf Arabs fear Israel is becoming Goliath.”
[15] Camille Lons, “East meets middle: China’s blossoming relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2024. https://ecfr.eu/publication/east-meets-middle-chinas-blossoming-relationship-with-saudi-arabia-and-the-uae/ ; Ariel Admoni, “Public Opinion Matters to Qatar. Israel Must Take Advantage of It,” The Arena, 19 February 2025 (in Hebrew). https://www.arenajournal.org.il/single-post/admoni-qatar-israel
[16] Magid, “UAE warns Israel.”
[17] Aziz Alghashian and Rob Pinfold, “Despite Netanyahu's Claims, the Israel-Iran War Pushed Saudi Arabia Away From Normalization, Not Closer,” Opinion section, Haaretz.com, 3 July 2025. https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2025-07-03/ty-article-opinion/.premium/despite-netanyahus-claims-iran-war-pushed-the-saudis-away-from-normalization-not-closer/00000197-cf8f-d083-a3b7-ffffa1260000
[18] Sébastian Seibt, “Israel-Iran war undermines Beijing’s Mideast diplomatic push,” Analysis, France24, 19 June 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250619-outbreak-of-israel-iran-war-leaves-china-s-mideast-diplomacy-at-an-impasse
[19] Niloufar Baghernia, “China’s Marginal Involvement In The 2023 Iran-Saudi Arabia Reconciliation,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 55, Issue 1, pp. 34-51. https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2024.2329615
[20] Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “China calls for global efforts to defuse tensions over vital Strait of Hormuz,” EuroNews, 23 June 2025. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/06/23/china-calls-for-global-efforts-to-defuse-tension-over-vital-strait-of-hormuz
[21] Yossi Mann, “Israel-Iran War Shows Global Markets No Longer Fear Middle Eastern Crises,” The Arena, 16 July 2025. https://www.eng.arenajournal.org.il/single-post/mann-israel-iran-war-energy-sector
[22] Zachary Cohen, Alayna Treene, “Kylie Atwood and Jennifer Hansler, Exclusive: Details emerge of secret diplomatic efforts to restart Iran talks,” CNN, 26 June 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/06/26/politics/us-iran-talks-nuclear-program
[23] See for example: “China Ready to Play Constructive Role in Restoring Peace, Stability in Middle East: FM Spokesman,” CCTV Plus, 19 June 2025. https://www.cctvplus.com/news/20250619/8433118.shtml#!language=1
[24] AP and ToI Staff, “US public approval of Israeli offensive in Gaza at lowest point of war — poll,” Times of Israel, 29 July 2025. https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-public-approval-of-israeli-offensive-in-gaza-at-lowest-point-of-war-poll/
[25] Megan Brenan, “32% in U.S. Back Israel's Military Action in Gaza, a New Low,” Gallup, 29 July 2025. https://news.gallup.com/poll/692948/u.s.-back-israel-military-action-gaza-new-low.aspx; William A. Galston and Jordan Muchnick, “Support for Israel continues to deteriorate, especially among Democrats and young people,” Commentary, Brookings, 6 August 2025. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/support-for-israel-continues-to-deteriorate-especially-among-democrats-and-young-people/
[26] Itzhak Shichor, “America’s China Policy is Wrong. Israel Shouldn't Pay The Price,” The Arena, 24 March 2022. https://www.eng.arenajournal.org.il/single-post/issue11-shichor-israel-china-usa-eng
[27] Dr Gedaliah Afterman, Dr N. Janardhan Mohammed Baharoon, Dr Maximilian Mayer, Connectivity and ‘Reglobalization’: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and its Potential Digital Future, AGDA Insight, Abu Dhabi: Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, 7 April 2025. https://www.agda.ac.ae/research/publications-multimedia-events/publication-details/connectivity-and-reglobalization-india-middle-east-europeeconomic-corridor-and-itspotential-digital-future
[28] “UN Security Council rejects Russia and China’s resolution to delay sanctions on Iran,” PBS, 26 September 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/un-security-council-rejects-russia-and-chinas-resolution-to-delay-sanctions-on-iran